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LISTENING TO TRIBAL LEGENDS: AN ESSAY
ON LAW AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
NANCY LEVIT*
INTRODUCTION

CH of jurisprudence is storytelling. Jurisprudence recounts tales
A
i
of what has gone before; it improvises and crafts new stories of
legal theory from old ones. Useful kernels are passed from one generation of legal thinkers to the next. Like tribal legends, the messages in
many stories of jurisprudence can be understood only by a select audience. Legends often come with morals; theories of jurisprudence often
impart prescriptions for living within the law. 1 Jurisprudence, like legends, concerns fundamental issues, confronts cosmic questions and
weaves in magic.2 Sometimes both possess humor as well.3
Unfortunately, some modern versions of jurisprudential theories have
become anecdotal-capturing partial essences, caricaturing details and
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City. J.D. 1984, University of Kansas. I wish to thank Jack Balkin, Corinne Cooper, Dennis Corgill, Barbara
Glesner, Bob Hayman, Mary Kay Kisthardt, Doug Linder, Joan Mahoney, John Ragsdale, Ellen Suni and Ibrahim Wani for their helpful comments. Particular thanks to
Martin Levit-for so many reasons. I plead guilty to rampant overgeneralization in making universal statements about jurisprudential theories and to the fallacy of composition
for describing the views of individual thinkers as those of a school of thought. Cf K.
Llewellyn & E. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence 19 (1941) ("it is impossible to tell a story without the use of words which carry
flavor far beyond the mere behavior-sequence of events").
1. See, e.g., Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: PlantingSeeds in
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 16-17 (1988) ("Left alone to reseed, the
phlox will soon revert to the old muddy-purple, disappointing the gardener who first
planted a rainbow of lemon, white, garnet, lavender, and apricot. We must tend our
garden lovingly, lest we revert to the boring world of one color, one idea."); Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Idealsfrom DeconstructedRights, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 401, 431 (1987) ("In many mythologies, the mask of the sorcerer is also the
source of power. To unmask the sorcerer is to depower. So CLS' unmasking rights mythology in liberal America is to reveal the source of much powerlessness masquerading as
strength.").
2. See R. Erdoes & A. Ortiz, American Indian Myths and Legends xi-xv (1984); B.
Malinowski, Myth in Primitive Psychology, in Magic, Science and Religion 93 (1954).
This point is also illustrated by the debate regarding the merits of ingenious sparks and
grand theory-building as opposed to conventional jurisprudence. Compare Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 377-78 (1987) (arguing for presumption in favor
of conventional wisdom) and Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 917
(1986) (arguing that "brilliant" academic work that tends to challenge conventional wisdom should be abandoned) with Schlag, The Brilliant, the Curious and the Wrong, 39
Stan. L. Rev. 917, 919-24 (1987) (responding to Farber--questioning supposition that
merely because brilliant theories can be developed only by a few people, they are unlikely
to be correct, and suggesting that brilliance is less a matter of consent or majority comprehension and more a matter of conjuring up novel avenues for exploration).
3. See V. Haviland, North American Legends 13-17 (1979); cf Denvir, William
Shakespeare and the Jurisprudence of Comedy, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 825, 826-27, 840-48
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losing salient messages in the telling. Theorists narrate selective parables,
but lessons from the full history of the tribe have been lost. The legal
storytellers engage in revisionist tales of history4 and the listeners selectively perceive.' In many ways, we are not listening to our tribal legends.
One of the stories of jurisprudence is the account of law and science.

In essence, it is the tale of two tribes, each with its own legends, prescriptions and imagery. Different schools of jurisprudence have treated science in legal theory in varied ways. The history of jurisprudence has
seen principles of science relied on as a model for legal theory, used to
support social action theories of law, dismissed as unhelpful to normative
questions faced by law, and decried as a construct that masks choices
that are ultimately political.
There have been scattered attempts to apply particular scientific or social science frameworks to law to explain or predict case outcomes, analyze data or empirically support propositions relating to substantive
issues. 6 Scholarly attention has recently returned to the possibilities of(1987) (comedy can serve as paradigm for legal theory because it deals with liberation
and social regeneration).
Pierre Schlag presents a capsulized history of the inspiration in jurisprudence provided
by European social theorists:
In the past two decades, fancy law review scholarship has replicated the intellectual history of the past three centuries. Against an unholy combination of
Locke, Bentham, and Hobbes that was well ensconced in the scholarship of the
fifties, the right-and-principles people pulled out Kant. Of course, if Kant can
be put to good use, it takes no great leap of mind to recognize that Marx and
the Frankfurt school can be pressed into service as well. From there things
began to accelerate rapidly. Someone retaliates with Wittgenstein. Others respond with French structuralists. From there it is a small step to Derrida. Too
far for some: They answer back with Dilthey and Gadamer. But for every
Gadamer, there is a Habermas. And every Habermas has his Foucault. Foucault is dead. We are running out of Europeans.
Schlag, supra note 2, at 917 n.l.
Articles that do not amount to jurisprudential tracts also offer comic relief. Presumably most scholars have their own favorite candidate. My offerings are Aside, The Common Law Originsof the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1474 (1975); Bartels, Capital
Punishment: The Unexamined Issue of Special Deterrence, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (1983).
4. Of course, this practice is not limited to jurisprudential theorizing. The selection
of supportive accounts, passages and arguments is endemic in law.
5. Interpretation of any kind-athletic, artistic, musical, legal-inescapably involves
partial and incomplete comprehension. "[A] man hears what he wants to hear, [a]nd
disregards the rest." P. Simon, The Boxer (Columbia Records/CBS, Inc. 1968).
6. See, e.g., Channels, The Methods of Social Science and Their Use in Legal Proceedings, 16 Conn. L. Rev. 853 (1984) (acknowledging increasing use of social science
research in law and attempting to familiarize legal profession with methods and problems
in social science research); Finch, The Role of Social Sciences in the Study of Law, 12
Stetson L. Rev. 641 (1983) (traditional law school education that relies almost exclusively
on purely legal sources is flawed to the extent it ignores contributions social sciences can
make to law); Handler, The Judicial Pursuit of Knowledge: Truth and/or Justice, 41
Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 1-4 (1988) (identifying how scientific information, including that derived from the social sciences, can help resolve difficult legal issues associated with battered women's syndrome, child sexual abuse and surrogate parenting); Jensen & Horvitz,
A TheoreticalFrameworkfor Quantifying Legal Decisions, 20 Jurimetrics J. 121 (1979)
(arguing for quantitative rather than qualitative approach to legal analysis).
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fered by science to shape legal theory.7 Some commentary discusses the
ways in which the scientific model can operate on the decisional level.8
There has been no systematic attempt, however, to define the modem
scientific method in the context of law or to analyze its application to

jurisprudence. Recent jurisprudential theories contrast science9 with

practical reason.1" Consequently, a significant controversy is emerging
over the use of the scientific method in jurisprudence.
Part I of this Article defines the criteria of theory-building that comprise the modem scientific method. It observes that the use of science in
law has been limited by the prevailing assumption that principles of scientific inquiry must be abandoned when law faces value choices. This
Article posits that the scientific method's criteria of validation 1 can ap-

ply to decisions about values as well as facts. This Article makes the
stronger claim that certain values, such as openness, humility and
nonchauvinism inhere in the criteria of theory validation-simplicity,
depth, fertility and falsifiability. The principles of scientific inquiry are
essentially criteria of rationality. To the extent that the goal of law is
7. See, eg., Fuller, Playing Without a Full Deck- Scientific Realism and the Cognitive Limits of Legal Theory, 97 Yale L.J. 549, 567-71 (1988) (scientific realism offers
method of recognizing, if not skirting, the limits of indeterminacy debate); Goldberg, The
CentralDogmas of Law and Science, 36 J. Legal Educ. 371, 372 (1986) (describing central epistemological features of science and their impact on the study of law and science);
Yablon, Law and Metaphysics (Book Review), 96 Yale L.J. 613, 614 (1987) (discussing
resurgence of interest in realist philosophy).
8. See, e.g., Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use ofSocialScience in
Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559 (1987) (suggesting that social frameworks may assist decisionmakers in determining factual issues such as the validity of eyewitness identification
and the battered woman's syndrome); Note, The Scientific Model in Law, 75 Geo. L.J.
1967, 1981 (1987) ("[tlhe explanatory usefulness of the scientific model of legal analysis is
probably most important to legal theorists").
9. See generally Fuller, supra note 7, at 552 (scientific realism being ignored in contemporary legal theory debates); Merges, The Nature and Necessity of Law and Science,
38 J. Legal Educ. 315 (1988) (assessing the impact of law and science on legal education
and theory); Miller, The Science of Law: The Maturingof Jurisprudenceinto Fundamental Principles in Fairness, 13 W. St. U.L. Rev. 367, 399-404 (1986) (science of law is
defined by certain fundamental principles); Walker & Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 877 (1988) (methodologies used by
social scientists should be accorded precedential value; specific applications of methodology should not); Ziegler, A General Theory ofLaw as a Paradigmfor Legal Research, 51
Mod. L. Rev. 569, 584-91 (1988) (attempting to develop a legal paradigm so law can
advance like science); Note, supra note 8, at 2001 (law benefits from science and can be
studied scientifically).
10. See generally Farber & Frickey, PracticalReason and the FirstAmendment, 34
UCLA L. Rev. 1615 (1987) (criticizing approaches to first amendment law based on abstract grand theories and arguing for practical reason approach); Feinman, Practical
Legal Studies and CriticalLegalStudies, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 724, 728-31 (1988) (analyzing
practical legal studies as response to critical legal studies); Kronman, Practical Wisdom
and ProfessionalCharacter,in Philosophy and Law 203, 206 (J. Coleman & E. Paul eds.
1987) (lawyers need practical wisdom as well as theoretical knowledge to do their jobs
properly); Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 827, 837-58 (1988)
(advocating use of practical reason and outlining methods of practical reason).
11. The criteria of validation are used in both theory-building and theory validation.
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rationality, legal theory should follow the criteria contained in and adopt
the values implied by the scientific method.
Part II describes how various schools of jurisprudence have treated
scientific method. Parts III and IV question science's role in law and
suggest that the scientific method can assist scholars and judges on both
the theoretical and decisional levels. As metatheory, the criteria of validation afford universal standards for good theory-building. They can
help evaluate the rationality and utility of theories of jurisprudence. As
part of a decisional methodology, the criteria can lead to empowered inquiry-to greater openness in decisionmaking, better reasoned analysis
and, perhaps, more just results.
This Article does not attempt to articulate a comprehensive theory of
science, law or the intersection of the two; nor does it offer a positive
program of "scientific" adjudications for decisionmakers. Its goal is to
entice both jurists and theorists into thinking more systematically and
self-analytically about their theories, reasoning, conclusions and areas of
ignorance. This Article suggests that attention to the principles of scientific inquiry is one method of improving the rationality of legal decisions
and theories.
I.

AN

AccouNT

OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

To those who assert that Scientific Method is inconceivable in the Law,

we ask the blunt question of Alice in Wonderland:
'Have you ever
12
tried it?' And if not how do you know?
Legal theory contains no inherent set of methodological assumptions.1 3 Instead, law scavenges other disciplines for its methodology.' 4
Indeed, most contemporary theories of jurisprudence-law and economics, law and society, and critical legal studies-rely to some degree on
empiricism in theory formation and verification. 5 While discourse on
the "scientific" nature of jurisprudential theories abounds,' 6 surprisingly
little attention is given to what it means for a theory to be "scientific."
Definitions of science vary even among commentators who discuss the
meaning of science as applied to theory-building.' 7 It is important,
12. Lavery, Scientific Method in the Law-Its Uses and Limitations, 36 Chi. B. Rec.

303, 310 (1955) (emphasis in original).
13. See Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Liebniz to Langdell, 30 Am.

J. Legal Hist. 95, 96 (1986).
14. See Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 Colum. L. Rev. 38,
38 (1985); see also Posner, The Decline ofLaw as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 Harv. L. Rev. 761, 767-69 (1987) (describing how economics and philosophy have

had increasing impact on law).
15. As this Article demonstrates, law and economics, for example, pays little more
than lip service to scientific principles. See infra notes 126-136 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., Priest, The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark
and Posner,90 Yale L.J. 1284 (1981) (pointing out weaknesses of scientific study of law).
17. See, e.g., Kertz & Hasson, University Research and Development Activities: The
FederalIncome Tax Consequencesof Research Contracts,Research Subsidiariesand Joint
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therefore, to discuss the meaning of the scientific method.
A.

Criteriafor Theory-Building

Some philosophers of science dispute the existence of a single scientific
method.1 8 This dispute may mean only that the scientific method itself is
adaptive and, therefore, has changed and evolved historically.1 9 The
term "scientific method" encompasses two separate ideas. The first is a
method of inquiry or experimentation-the accepted principles of the
means of obtaining knowledge about things.2' The second is a set of
standards for sound theory-criteria for theory validation. This Article
is concerned with the procedures for improving legal theory by using the
criteria of validation. While categorization differs, there is a generally
accepted set of principles for scientific theory-building. It must be emphasized, though, that while these criteria are interrelated-and exclusive reliance on a single criterion can lead to poor theory-building-the
principles are not fully compatible. The theory that offers the greatest
explanatory power, for example, may not be the theory that is the most
simple.2 '
Ventures, 13 J.C.U.L. 109, 120 (1986) (science is "the process by which knowledge is
systematized or classified through the use of observation, experimentation or reasoning");
Miller, supra note 9, at 367 (science may be viewed "as an objective system with demonstrably recurrent principles"); Note, supra note 8, at 1967 n.2 ("science can be thought of
as an approach to understanding characterized by (1) empirical testing and (2) rational
inquiry").
Martin Golding charges that realist legal theory smacks of scientism. See Golding,
Jurisprudenceand Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century America-Major Themes and
Developments, 36 J. Legal Educ. 441, 453 (1986). But what Golding means by the appellation is little more than the negative effects of using empirical results to dictate value
choices. In Note, Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation,40 Stan. L. Rev. 1517,
1535 (1988), the author refers to Gadamer's view of scientism in theory construction,
which he defined simply as "the existence of objectively valid meaning." Philosopher of
science Abraham Kaplan defines "scientism" as "the pernicious exaggeration of both the
status and function of science in relation to our values." A. Kaplan, The Conduct of
Inquiry 405 (1964).
The meaning of science is more than a semantic struggle. Until the objectives of science are clearly and consistently referenced, the utility to law of the principles of scientific
inquiry will be limited. Professor Ernest Nagel suggests that "[t]he practice of scientific
method is the persistent critique of arguments, in the light of tried canons for judging the
reliability of the procedures by which evidential data are obtained, and for assessing the
probative force of the evidence on which conclusions are based." E. Nagel, The Structure
of Science 13 (1961).
18. See, ag., S. Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding 17 (1961).
19. See Levit, Common Sense, Scientific Method, and EducationalResearch, 7 Stud.
Phil. & Educ. 130, 135 (1970) ("the general principles of scientific inquiry are themselves
reconstructed historically as their clarity, comprehensiveness, and other characteristics
are tested by inquiries in specific and varied domains").
20. See generally J. Feibleman, Scientific Method: The Hypothetico-Experimental
Laboratory Procedure of the Physical Sciences 26 (1972) (attempting to catalog principles of scientific method for uniformity of application). This is the process of hypothesis
creation and testing. This Article is not concerned with the collection of data, derivation
of hypotheses or process of manipulative experimentation.
21. It should also be recognized that there is no hierarchy of criteria. The "most
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1. Simplicity
The first criterion of theory confirmation is simplicity, which is also

often referred to as economy or elegance.2 2 Simplicity refers to a theory's
ability to explain all of the relevant phenomena in a single set of ideas.
Popularly known as Ockham's Razor, it posits that the least complicated
theory or explanation is preferred.23 Simplicity is perhaps the most pervasive criterion for theory-building because it concerns the integrity of a
system of theory. Simplicity refers to the neatness of the conceptual
package and the lack of exceptions or ad hoc explanations of phenomena
inconsistent with the main precepts of the theory.24 The absence of
autohypotheses and autoexplanations requires a uniformity of laws and
principles. Simplicity, ironically, encompasses a complex body of principles25 including syntactical simplicity (economy of the structure of the
theory), semantic simplicity (limitation on the number of presupposi-

tions), epistemological simplicity (economy of concepts with transcendent or generalized components) and pragmatic simplicity (ease of
testability).2 6
The purpose of simplicity, and of the other characteristics of scientific
theory, is to achieve greater and more accurate knowledge and explanations.27 The quest for simplicity also serves as a stimulus for integrating
and unifying knowledge and as a warning against protecting favored theories by ad hoc explanations. Simplicity subsumes fertility, extensibility
and depth because it indicates that these explanatory concepts are not
scientific" theory would be the one that comports most closely with the greatest number
of these criteria.
22. Originally, Greek philosophers of science assumed that the shortest and most direct theory was preferable for aesthetic reasons. See generally On Aesthetics in Science 13 (J. Wechsler ed. 1978) (collection of essays discussing the role of aesthetics in science
and scientific methodology). This notion was developed from an instinct that "the beauty
of a theory implie[d] its truth" to a recognition that energy efficiency in theory construction and testing had scientific merit. G. Gale, Theory of Science: An Introduction to the
History, Logic, and Philosophy of Science 217 (1979).
23. See, e.g., I M. Adams, William Ockham 156 (1987) (Ockham's principle of parsimony was that "[lt is futile to do with more what can be done with fewer"); see also P.
Frank, Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy 350-51 (1957)
("among all theories that can account for the same observed facts the 'simplest' theories
are chosen").
24. For example, the Ptolemaic or geocentric view of the universe suggested that all
celestial bodies orbited the earth, which remained immovable in the center of the cosmos.
Johannes Kepler adopted the simpler Copernican heliocentric cosmology, explaining that
earth orbited elliptically as well. See Rosen, Cosmologyfrom Antiquity to 1850, in 1 Dictionary of the History of Ideas 535, 545-46 (1973).
25. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Bunge, The Complexity ofSimplicity, 59
J.Phil. 113 (1962).
26. See Bunge, The Weight ofSimplicity in the Constructionand Assaying ofScientific
Theories, 28 Phil. Sci. 120, 121 (1961).
27. See id. at 125-26 ("Logical neatness and conceptual connectedness are then not
luxuries but means for ensuringtestability, which in turn is a necessary-but, of course,
not a sufficient-prerequisite for attaining approximate truth." (emphasis in original)).
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reducible to observations in a limited area. Thus, simplicity is an essential and cumulative criterion.
2.

Explanatory Power

A theory must possess sufficient explanatory force: it must accurately
explain the phenomena under study. A theory's power is measured by its
ability to advance understanding. An explanatory theory answers a
study's initial questions and spins out implications and connections. The
explanatory power of a theory of jurisprudence, for example, depends on
its ability to explain or influence judicial decisionmaking.2 8
One type of explanatory power is predictive ability: how well a theory
can forecast new facts and relations. 2 9 In a sense, predictive power may
be distinct from explanatory power because it adds the future dimension
to theorizing. This ability is not necessary to sound theory-building, because many theories are not
intended to be predictive and explanations
30
can occur on other levels.
3.

Depth or Constructivity

Closely aligned with explanatory power is the concept of depth. A
deep thesis goes beyond merely stating or describing phenomena. 31 It
explains possible causal relationships among observable phenomena, arranges isolated events into general patterns and seeks underlying explanations.3 2 Such hypotheses postulate some relations that are not always
obvious to the senses and draw together interdisciplinary phenomena.3 3
28. See Powers, On Positive Theoriesof Tort Law (Book Review), 66 Tex. L. Rev. 191,
204 (1987).
29. See Bunge, supra note 26, at 133.
30. Predictive ability is not a sufficient (let alone necessary) condition for accepting
scientific theories. Indeed, primary reliance on predictiveness amounts to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent, for it posits that if a theory is true, we can expect specific
observations; and it concludes that because we found the specific observations, the theory
must be true.
31. See Martin, How to Be a Good Philosopherof Science: A Pleafor Empiricism in
MattersMethodological, in Methodology, Metaphysics and the History of Science 39 (R.
Cohen & M. Wartofsky eds. 1984) (deep theories "go beyond the appearance of things to
their innermost structure"). But see Feyerabend, How to Be a Good Empiricist-A Plea
for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological,in Readings in the Philosophy of Science 319,
320-21 (B.A. Brody ed. 1970) (advocating the advancement of scientific knowledge
through a profusion of theories).
32. "For example, the hypothesis that syphilis is only a skin disease is literally skindeep." 5 M. Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy 300 (1983).
33. See M. Levit, Theoretical Justification of the Proposed Interdisciplinary Doctoral
Program in Social Science 4 (1978) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at Fordham Law
Review) ("in the stronger sciences, 'deep' knowledge has been acquired by studies of historically selected and expanding networks of relations among phenomena, and not by
digging deeper holes in the same place with the same equipment"). To this extent, Marxism, which comprehends significant relations among social, economic and legal phenomena, is a theory possessing depth. See K. Marx, Das Kapital (1867). That, however, is
not a scientific endorsement of Marxism. Committed Marxists refuse to specify the conditions under which their belief structure is refutable. See Lakatos, Falsificationand the
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4. Fertility and Extensibility
A theory should have not only explanatory power, but also "exploratory power."'3 4 Fertile theories lead to greater precision and corroboration; they suggest new ideas, questions and theories." Like law, science
is often a search for questions rather than answers. Closely tied to fertility is extensibility: the ability of a theory to expand and apply to related
fields.3 6 The Darwinian theory of evolution, for example, has proven to
be unusually fertile and extensible-it has suggested applications, research designs and flaws in current approaches in fields ranging from
psychology to law.3 7 Similarly, Rawls' theory of justice provoked not
only commentary, but also modification of jurisprudential theories.3 "
5. External Validity
A theory must be consistent with the generally accepted body of
knowledge, both within its own discipline and in other areas.3 9 This
facet of the scientific method leads to a restrained approach to new ideas
and, in some instances, excessive hostility to novel theories. It is this
healthy skepticism, however, which promotes theory-testing and validation. External validation ensures that theories are compatible with conclusions in other areas of inquiry. Theories that rely on and relate to
comprehensive and converging evidence from other disciplines are more
likely to be valid.
6.

Internal Consistency and Logic

A basic requirement of theory-building that is often taken for granted
is internal consistency and logic." The postulates of a hypothesis must
not conflict with one another. Furthermore, the premises of a theory,
Methodology ofScientific Research Programmes,in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge 91, 92 (I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970). Thus, some consider Marxism to be a
non-falsifiable theory.
34. Bunge, supra note 26, at 134.
35. See, e.g., J. Feibleman, supra note 20, at 51 (a fertile theory "is a conductor, not a
terminal point of investigation").
36. See H. Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality 90-91 (1950).
37. See, e.g., L. Cavalli-Sforza & M. Feldman, Cultural Transmission and Evolution
(1981) (discussing inheritance of acquired characteristics in the development of social
institutions); P. Medawar, Pluto's Republic 172-74 (1984) (same).
The literature applying evolutionary theory to law is equally rich. See, e.g., Clark, The
InterdisciplinaryStudy of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238 (1981); Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,85 Colum. L. Rev. 38 (1985); Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence,64 Tex. L. Rev. 645 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Bums, Rawls and the Principlesof Welfare Law, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 184
(1989); Griffin, ReconstructingRawls's Theory ofJustice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 715, 776-80 (1987).
39. See H. Margenau, supra note 36, at 87 ("Constructs admissible in science must be
multiply connected; they may not be insular or peninsular.").
40. See, e.g., Kaufmann, The Nature of Scientific Method, 12 Soc. Res. 464, 474
(1945) ("A scientific decision must not lead to a scientific situation containing two incompatible propositions.").
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along with observations and data, must lead to conclusions through logically valid reasoning. A hypothesis must be free of logical fallacies and
paradoxes-it cannot simultaneously support contrary propositions. 4 1
7. Falsifiability
Theories must be testable and refutable.42 If theories are non-falsifiable, they are unscientific. Hypotheses that avoid testability-for exampie,- those concerning the existence of supernatural beings-are not
scientific. Likewise, theories that purport to explain everything, theories
that are unconditional and admit no negative evidence and theories that
are vague or otherwise self-protected are not falsifiable. A non-refutable
theory has no explanatory value:
It is easy to construct deceptively powerful looking but empty explanations of case law. For example, suppose we hypothesize that all judging is a matter of cost benefit analysis with the society's priorities
measured, say, in utiles; the judge is the representative of society
charged with doing the analysis, including the assignment of utile values. This will always work-the hypothesis will never be falsified. 43
Refutability of a theory's final state must be distinguished from the
process of theory development and refinement. Theories are constructed
by a process of "conjecture, refutation, reconjecture and so on... [that]
emphasises the dynamic nature of theory creation."'
8.

Other Criteria

Many other desiderata of good theory-building are umbilical to those
mentioned. I note just a few here without exploring them in depth. The
predicates, assumptions and methodologies of a theory must be publicly
verifiable and open. 45 In addition, originality in theory-building is desir41. In the realm of legal theorizing, there is a tremendous body of literature discussing the relative usefulness of types of reasoning: deductive, inductive and analogical. See,
e.g., Broiles, The Principles ofLegal Reasoning, 17 Mercer L. Rev. 389 (1966); Landau,
Logic for Lawyers, 13 Pac. L.J. 59, 67-89 (1981); Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal

Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 833 (1982). However, different types of reasoning reflect
not the validity of the form of a theory, but the kinds of reasons given for the theory's
claims.
42. See K. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery ch. iv (1959); see also Potter,
Testability, Flexibility: Kuhnian Values in Scientists' Discourse Concerning Theory

Choice, 14 Phil. Soc. Sci. 303, 309 (1984) ("testability is not merely important but is a
central and necessary feature of science. It is only by testing explanations, and rejecting
those that fail such tests, that scientific activity will progress").
43. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. Det. L. Rev. 451, 471 n.119

(1987).
44. M. Nicholson, The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour 43 (1983).
45. Scientific openness has its analog in constitutional notions of procedural due process. See Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 Cornell L. Rev.
817, 825 (1977) ("[Olpenness is in everyone's best interests ....[w]hen the issues are
controversial, any decision may fail to satisfy large portions of the community. But those
who are dissatisfied with a particular decision will be more likely to acquiesce in it if they
perceive that their views and interests were given a fair hearing.").
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able. "The most influential theories are... those which are the more
thought-provoking and, particularly, those which inaugurate new ways
of thinking ... such as Newtonian mechanics, field theory, quantum
theory, and evolutionism."" Fertility, comprehensiveness, depth and
other criteria are intertwined with creativity.
All of the criteria offer ways to improve the conceptual and operational clarity of theories. These criteria should be thought of not simply
as rules in the game of scientific method, but as means of improving the
cogency and objectivity of theories-as criteria of rationality.
B.

The Scientific Method and Values: Is and Ought

The principal challenge to the application of the scientific method to
legal thinking is the asserted inability of science to assist in the choice
among competing values.4 7 Our culture believes that science and values
are strangers. Many philosophers of science, however, believe that the
principles of scientific inquiry need not be abandoned at the threshold of
moral judgments.4" In fact, the thesis that values can be rationally
grounded is fairly widespread in philosophical literature. One form of
this thesis involves reliance on general principles of logic and science,
arguing that the principles of the scientific method imply certain moral
postures and value choices.
The criteria of scientific inquiry also mandate a different approach to
values. Values must not be viewed as isolated events separate from their
social contingencies. Moreover, the scientific method compels an approach to value judgments that requires critical inquiry into the foundations of moral choices.49
46. Bunge, supra note 26, at 135; see also Dyson, Innovation in Physics, 199 Sci. Am.

(no. 3) 74, 76 (1958) ("The reason why new concepts in any branch of science are hard to
grasp is always the same; contemporary scientists try to picture the new concept in terms
of ideas which existed before. The discoverer himself suffers especially from this difficulty; he arrived at the new concept by struggling with the old ideas, and the old ideas
remain the language of his thinking for a long time afterward.").
47. See, e.g., Funk, Legal History as EmpiricalSocial Science in Theory and Practice,
21 Hous. L. Rev. 311, 320 n.23 (1984) ("Most scholars believe that ultimate values by
which individual events are critically evaluated cannot be verified by scientific methods."); Mearns, Scientific Legal Theory and Arnold Brecht, 47 Va. L. Rev. 264, 265

(1961) ("real crisis in scientific legal theory is the rise of the theoretical opinion that no
scientific choice between values can be made").
48. See Levit, Noncognitivist Ethics,Scientific Method, and Education, 2 Stud. Phil. &
Educ. 304, 305-06 (1963); Scheffier, Science, Morals and EducationalPolicy, 26 Harv.
Educ. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1956); see also Note, supra note 8, at 1969 ("The analogy [of the
scientific model to law] suggests an attitude as much as a systematic approach to problem

solving. Its core is a spirit of empirically based skepticism.., that transcends any specific
methodology." (emphasis in original)). Compare Funk, Religion, EthicalNatural Consequentialism, and the Science of Justice, 8 Cap. U.L. Rev. 371, 371-72 (1979) (positing that

if certain religious premises are accepted, empirical verification of value propositions is
possible).
49. See Nagel, Philosophyof Science and EducationalTheory, 7 Stud. Phil. & Educ. 5,

18 (1969).
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The criteria of scientific inquiry require a hypothetical or experimental
approach to theory and practice. This attitude encompasses provisional
acceptance of theories, healthy skepticism and anti-dogmatism. 0 Carried a step further, the scientific method necessitates humility on the part
of theorists. Pretensions to knowledge are as unscientific as ignorance,
and more dangerous. 1
Further, the criteria of validation demand openness in process and results. The process of hypothesis-testing and falsification calls for methods that have the greatest explanatory value. 2 Explanation requires
exposition: it is "the deliberate policy of science to expose its cognitive
claims53to the repeated challenge of critically probative observational
data.",

Scientific methods also foster non-chauvinism. The essence of the scientific method-the initial premise of objectivity and the process of theory creation, testing, falsification and reconjecture-prohibits
prejudgment. There can be no a priori exclusions on the basis of class
characteristics.
A final example of how the criteria of scientific inquiry translate into
moral judgments comes from the general objective of scientific explanation. Science attempts to provide increasingly comprehensive explanations of events and relations.5 4 Thus, the scientific method is inimical to
barriers to thought, whether educational, economic or social. Similarly,
the principles of scientific inquiry lead to communalist rather than individualist resolutions of disputes, because they favor more complex and
contextual explanations of causation rather than anachronistic individualist views of self-sufficient agents. 55 These illustrations are not exhaus50. See, e.g., G. Gale, Theory of Science 204 (1979) ("The soul of scientific epistemology will die if it becomes committed to the view that knowledge is confined only to the
established notions.").
51. The need for humility in endeavors of inquiry is illustrated by the Indian doctrine
of syadvada (that all propositions are true only in certain respects) and the accompanying
Jain legend of the blind men who are exploring different parts of the same elephant. See
A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry 310 (1964).
52. See Loevinger, Jurimetrics: Science in Law, in Scientists in the Legal System 7, 11
(W. Thomas ed. 1974) ("Science recognizes no meaning that is not empirically definable
and accepts no significance that is not empirically demonstrable.").
53. E. Nagel, supra note 17, at 12.
54. See M. Bunge, supra note 32, at 187.
Primitive and archaic thought are characteristically qualitative and analogical.
By employing exclusively qualitative or dichotomous predicates, primitives and
ancients were necessarily led to dichotomous or polar classings: cold and hot,
heavy and light, clear and dark, near and far, wild and domesticated, good and
bad. This mode of conception misses nuances and is apt to lead to a Manichean
or a dialectal world view. Scientific and technological thinking on the other
hand, presumes that most properties come in degrees-of heaviness and speed,
heat and nearness, excitation and value, and so on. Only in some backward
branches of the social sciences and the humanities most thinking remains qualitative, hence polar or black and white.
Id.
55. Tort and contract law, for example, were shaped around individualist notions of
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tive.5 6 They are simply examples of value choices and value decision
methodology impelled by the criteria of scientific inquiry.
These examples should not lead to the conclusion that the scientific
method alone can resolve value questions. No open system can. Abstract concepts alone cannot generate a concrete series of results because
general categories do not decide specific instances. However, the criteria
of the scientific method can contribute to theory selection
in jurispru57
dence and to the crafting of decisions in individual cases.
II.

THE TALE OF JURISPRUDENCE

Various schools of jurisprudence-classical legal theory, realism, law

and society, law and economics, critical legal studies and practical reason-have treated the intersection of law and science differently. To the
extent that jurisprudence is the process of building explanatory theories
about law, the scientific method offers a means of assessing their

usefulness.
First, some caveats and disclaimers. Scientific method cannot achieve
certainty about jurisprudence, or anything else, because science does not
erase the contingencies of the world. No scientific law determines anything. 8 Scientific conclusions are preliminary and tentative; they call for
elaboration and falsification. Scientific inquiry simply offers methods for
responsibility and unicausal premises; only recently have they contemplated rules to juggle the effects of multiple causes. See generally Holt, Recovery by the Worker Who Quits:
A Comparison of the Mainstream,Legal Realist,and CriticalLegalStudies Approaches to
a Problem of Nineteenth Century ContractLaw, 1986 Wis. L. Rev. 677 (reassessing contract principle that denied pay to workers who did not complete performance in light of
more capacious view of multiple causes); Horwitz, The Doctrineof Objective Causation, in
The Politics of Law 201 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (describing challenge to objective view of
causation in tort law); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849, 905-24 (1984) (proposing
that current system of case-by-case adjudication in mass exposure cases be replaced by
public law system where exposed parties would be compensated according to probability
of disease risk in exposed population); Wright, Causationin Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev.
1735, 1788-1803 (1985) (advocating new test for tort causation). Standing law reflects a
parallel course of development. See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem
ofSelf-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1478 (1988). Both bodies of law evolved at the
expense of communal considerations of multiple parts, sources, paths and effects.
56. Many versions of basic democratic principles are social applications of general
scientific criteria. For instance, the legislative process recognizes the absence of universal, external truths, the need to question and change basic assumptions, contextual conditioning of principles (majority rule, but recognition of minority rights) and a process of
decisionmaking based on public, verifiable information.
57. See infra Part III.
58. Laws of motion, for example, are uniform and constant in our portion of the
universe; they are always operative. Yet the laws of motion only describe and never
prescribe. They never cause an object to turn right or left, or to move up or down.
See, e.g., A. Kaplan, supra note 51, at 402 ("A scientific approach does not suddenly
come into being at the magical moment when we know 'enough'; such moments never
arrive."); see also Note, supra note 8, at 1967 ("We have received so many gifts from the
wizard science that we have come to associate science with truth and experiments with
answers.").
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gaining greater probabilistic knowledge, which itself may become
obsolete.
Similarly, no scientific analysis of jurisprudential theories can illuminate the single best ideology. Theoretical elixirs are not in the repertoire
of science. The danger of viewing a critique of jurisprudence as no less
and no more than a scientific inquiry is the hazard of legitimating areas
of uncertainty. The scientific method, however, can test assumptions,
provide a powerful critique for ideologies, suggest new avenues of exploration and lead to empowered theory-building.
A.

ClassicalLegal Theory and the Science of Law

Nineteenth-century legal theorists advocated the scientific study of

law.59 Their model of the science of law was mechanistic: they viewed

the process of lawmaking as a deductive science. Lawmaking consisted
of judges syllogistically reaching solutions using existing legal principles
as major premises and the "facts" of particular cases as minor premises.' Law was considered a determinate collection of rules derived

from natural law, not an instrument for social change.6 1
In the 1870s, Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dean of the Harvard
Law School, pioneered an empirical case-method approach to the study
of law. 2 The case-study method treated judicial decisions as raw data
subject to scientific investigation by jurists and scholars. Langdell believed that enduring principles of law existed that could guide decisions
in future cases, and that the jurist's task was to select the appropriate
legal rules for a given case.6 3
Langdell's conception of law as science assumed that once a legal truth
was established, it endured." 4 He viewed law as an objective system with
59. See, e.g., R.F. Clark, The Science of Law and Lawmaking 3 (1898) (law "as one
of the family of sciences, [is] subject like the rest to certain fundamental principles"); see
also W. Hastie, Outlines of the Science of Jurisprudence 118-219 (1887) (jurisprudence as
science concerned with principles of right); Mayes, Whether Law Is a Science?, 9 Am.
Jurist 349, 354 (1833) ("The science of law... is that knowledge whereby we distinguish
between the just and the unjust, reduced into a system, and arranged so as to be conveniently taught, easily remembered and readily applied.").
60. If one could reveal the nature of the elemental building blocks (people or
atoms, for example), and the organizing principles that held them together (e.g.,
human relations or chemical bonds), [classical theorists] believed that the structure of the whole system would become apparent and expressable, as in the
form of restatements or treatises, or periodic charts.
Note, supra note 8, at 1974-75.
61. See Horwitz, The Emergence of an Instrumental Conception of American Law,
1780-1820, 5 Persp. in Am. Hist. 287, 291 (1971); Comment, Formalistand Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 119, 126 (1985).
62. See Hoeflich, supra note 13, at 119-21.
63. See, e.g., C. Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts viii (2d ed.
1879) ("Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have
such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to
the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.").
64. See G. Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 42-43 (1977).
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concrete, recurrent principles.65 Langdell's scientific approach to legal
theory relied on formal logic. Scientific inquiry consisted simply of inductively extracting rules from a series of cases and deductively reason-

ing decisions in new cases from those fixed legal rules. Law progressed
only when a jurist or scholar discovered a previously undivined principle
that explained prior decisions.66 The Langdellian model was closed,
complete and largely static. Moreover, this model used an inductive conception of science, in which thought moves from the particular and concrete to the general and abstract by finding recurrent, essential

identifying traits. Such a model is now rejected by most theoreticians

and philosophers of science. 67
A number of Langdell's peers disagreed with the immutable nature of
his law-as-science theories. According to Samuel Williston, Langdell's
system "[did not] sufficiently take account of changes in law as a constant and necessary process, however gradual and slow." 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and John Chapman Gray quarreled with the
Langdellian process of separating cases from their historical and social
context and rendering decisions by analyzing whether the cases fit existing legal doctrine.6 9
Langdell's scientific technique "is criticized today as insufficiently rigorous," 70 and his objective of discerning transcendent principles of law is
viewed as an "absurd task.",7 1 His unwavering7 2 emphasis on empirical
65. [The number of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly
supposed; the many different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly
making its appearance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension.... It seemed to
me, therefore, to be possible ... to select, classify, and arrange all the cases
which had contributed in any important [sic] degree to the growth, development, or establishment of any of its essential doctrines ....
C. Langdell, supra note 63, at viii-ix.
66. See Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1983). Several years
later Wesley Hohfeld engaged in a parallel endeavor to Langdell's attempt to enumerate
these scientific principles of law when he tried to produce analytic studies of the meaning
of rights discourse. See Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in
JudicialReasonings, 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913).
67. See P. Medawar, The Limits of Science 13-16 (1984); Chalmers, The Problem of
Induction, in What is This Thing Called Science? 12-21 (1982); Lakatos, Changes in the
Problem of Inductive Logic, in The Problem of Inductive Logic 315-417 (I. Lakatos ed.
1968).
68. S. Williston, Life and Law 200 (1941).
69. See White, The Impact of Legal Science on Tort Law, 1880-1910, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 213, 222 (1978); see also Book Review, 14 Am. L. Rev. 233, 234 (1880) ("the effort
to reduce.., concrete details ...to the merely logical consequence of simple postulates is
always in danger of becoming unscientific"). The current scientific method would disapprove of a system that called for the rejection of data inconsistent with the theory.
70. Note, supra note 8, at 1976.
71. Miller, supra note 9, at 388.
72. See G. Gilmore, supra note 64, at 42 ("Langdell seems to have been an essentially
stupid man who, early in his life, hit on one great idea to which, thereafter, he clung with
all the tenacity of genius.").
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analysis, however, was advanced for his time73 and his case method fos74
tered precision and brought fresh analytical inquiry to legal concepts.
B. Realism and Empiricism
The legal realist movement was a reaction to the formalism of classical
legal theory. The realists were not a cohesive group. They drew on different branches of the social sciences-psychology, economics, statistics-and had different assumptions about the ability of science to answer
normative questions in law." Most realists did unite, however, on common points of departure from the Langdellian tradition;7 6 collectively,
they condemned the formalists' rigid and unadaptive interpretation of
legal rules.
Classical analysis, according to the realists, failed to account for the7
indeterminacy of legal rules and the manipulability of legal reasoning.1
As a theory of science, classical analysis did not adequately account for
changes in law.7 8 Finally, the realists argued that deductive logic was of
73. Note, supra note 8, at 1976.
74. The case method forced students of law to approach original sources or cases
without relying on the collected wisdom of earlier scholars. See generally Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning ofAnti-Formalism in American Legal
Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1980) (defending Langdell's realist tenets of legal theory).
75. See Golding, Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy in Twentieth-Century
America-Major Themes and Developments, 36 J. Legal Educ. 441, 453 (1986); see also
Comment, supra note 61, at 122-23 (delineating three sub-schools of the legal realist
movement: the social-science group, the political-reformist group and the judicial-reasoning group). There is even some internal ambivalence in individual realists about the
utility of science to assist in the choice among value judgments. Compare Holmes, Law
in Science andScience in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 462 (1899) ("I have had in mind an
ultimate dependence upon science because it is finally for science to determine, so far as it
can, the relative worth of our different social ends."), with Holmes, Natural Law, 32
Harv. L. Rev. 40, 41 (1918) ("you can not argue a man into liking a glass of beer").
76. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1235-36 (1931); see also Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence,
44 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 700-09 (1931) (listing points of departure from formative school of
thought). For a rich examination of the socio-historical backdrop of the era and the
effect of developments in other disciplines on the realists' jurisprudence, see E. Purcell,
Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism & The Problem of Value 4794 (1973).
77. See Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1383, 1384; see
also K. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 4 (1960) ("men talk about contracts, and trusts,
and corporations, as if these things existed in themselves,, instead of being the shadows
cast across the front stage by the movements of the courts unheeded in the rear").
78. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious
minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of
policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons which have
been found for it, and enters on a new career.
O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 8 (1963); cf D. Shapere, Reason and the Search for
Knowledge 200 (1984) ("It is a condition of the adequacy of any philosophy of science
that it show how rational change in science is possible." (emphasis in original)).
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limited use in deciding most controversies. 79 Indeed, some realists suggested that intuitive methods were not only more representative of how
judges decided
cases, 80 but could be a preferable method of problem
81
solving.

Values were missing from classical legal theory's scientific universe.
The realists acknowledged the role of values in judicial decisionmaking
as well as the roles of social history and the consequences of decisions.82
While the realists remained committed to the scientific study of legal
concepts, they shifted the emphasis to analyzing the practical effects of
legal rules.8 3 These scholars focused on the judicial process and attempted to apply scientific methods to the study of decisionmaking; by so
doing, they hoped to improve the caliber of decisions.8 4
The empiricists, unlike their classicist predecessors, viewed law as an
observable and, in some measure, a calculable phenomenon. For realists,
the study of law comprised the examination of judicial behavior and prediction of future court action. Some realists stressed the necessity for
objective and external observation of law,86 so that the study would be
"uncontaminated by the desires of the observer."'8 7 Others called for
judges to improve the manner and quality of decisionmaking by acknowledging their own biases.8 8 Still others believed that a greater use of em79. See, e.g., Bingham, What Is the Law?, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1912) (judicial
generalizations are of questionable accuracy and utility).
80. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 14-23 (1921); see also Frank,
What CourtsDo in Fact, 26 Ill. L. Rev. 645, 653-55 (1932) (describing how hunches enter
and control the process of judicial decisionmaking).
81. See Hutcheson, The JudgmentIntuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274, 277 (1929).
82. See, e.g., Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 460-61 (1897)
(associating law less with formal logic and more with the behavior ofjudges); Llewellyn,
The Theory of Legal "Science" 20 N.C.L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1941) (recognizing that law of a
given era is, in part, a function of its social context); Pound, Law and the Science of Law
in Recent Theories, 43 Yale L.J. 525, 533-34 (1934) (proposing integration of law with
other disciplines to help develop criteria for valuing legal interests).
83. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 388-90 (realists changed focus of study from
finding the science of law to articulating practical, functional and malleable rules).
84. See White, From SociologicalJurisprudenceto Realism: Jurisprudenceand Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999, 1006-07 (1972). Even
when certain realists paid little attention to the scientific method, they drew upon scientific concepts as metaphors to illustrate arguments. See Note, supra note 8, at 1978; see
also B. Cardozo, Selected Writings of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 259 (1947) (suggesting
that Einstein's theory of relativity of measurements is paralleled by a "principle of relativity in the adaptation of the law to conduct.").
85. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 82, at 457 ("The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts.").
86. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 79, at 9 ("The lawyer, as does the scientist, studies
sequences of external phenomena and he studies them with a similar purpose-to determine their causes and effects and to acquire an ability to forecast sequences of the same
sort.").
87. Llewellyn, supra note 76, at 1236.
88. See J. Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 147 (1930).
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pirical data could assist in solving legal controversies 9 and that the
methods of scientific inquiry could aid in choosing among competing
value judgments.9" Realism moved from the classical concept of law as a
pure science to the idea that law was an interdisciplinary venture in
which scientific techniques, such as experiments and measurement, were
useful analytical tools, rather than elements of a decisional methodology. 91 In this sense, realism gave law a contextual footing. It recognized
that law was a vehicle for social change.
The realists' empiricism differed sharply from the classical law-as-science approach. Classical theorists viewed law as a set of axioms that, if
applied correctly, would lead to a scientifically valid outcome. Realism,
in contrast, stressed the futility of examining law as a set of rules. In
diametric opposition to the classical view that decisions were the product
of application of general principles in a given case, the realists emphasized that the validity of generalizations about laws should be tested
against actual rulings. 92 Although the exclusive importance the realists
gave to predictive success is overly simple and misleading as an empirical
guide, 93 they moved the scientific approach to law incrementally forward
by emphasizing the need for the testability of hypotheses about law.
Realism did not fall from intellectual grace in the same manner as did
classical thought. 94 However, it generated its share of skeptics and detractors, and failed to achieve many of its theoretical goals. Critics
faulted the behavioral focus of realism as a limited method of understanding a complex system.95 The realists' separation of positive law and
normative issues ("is" and "ought"), even for purposes of study, was
challenged as unrealistic and impractical.9 6 For example, Morris Cohen,
89. See, eg., Pound, The Scope and Purpose of SociologicalJurisprudence,24 Harv. L.
Rev. 591, 595-96 (1911) (rigid deduction from general principles favors logical predictability over justice).
90. See O.W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, in Collected Legal Papers
210, 225-26 (1920) ("The true science of law... [lies in] the establishment of its postulates ... upon accurately measured social desires.").
91. See, e.g., J. Frank, supra note 88, at 100-11 (suggesting that analysis of personal
judicial biases and sympathies significantly explained case outcomes); Haines, General
Observationson the Effects ofPersonal,Politicaland Economic Influences in the Decisions
of Judges, 17 Ill. L. Rev. 96, 115-16 (1922) (applying principles of behavioral science to
interpret the influences of various sociocultural factors on judges' decisions); Pound,
MechanicalJurisprudence, 8 Colum. L. Rev. 605, 620-23 (1908) (proposing use of the
scientific method to create a sociological jurisprudence).
92. See Cook, Williston on Contracts, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 497, 505 (1938) ("The 'realists'
will of course at once inquire whether ... broad generalizations will 'account for' the
'law' as it is found in the decisions. From their point of view that is the acid test of the
validity of any generalization."); Rumble, The Legal Positivism of John Austin and the
Realist Movement in American Jurisprudence,66 Cornell L. Rev. 986, 992 (1981).
93. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
94. See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 Buffalo L. Rev. 459, 459 (1979) ("As a coherent intellectual force in
American legal thought American Legal Realism simply ran itself into the sand.").
95. See Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429, 453-61 (1934).
96. See L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 64 (1940).
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himself a realist, insisted that any empirical approach to law should be
normative and that the nature of law as a social institution necessitated
97
standards for judgment apart from the results of empirical research.
More seriously, empirical social science research failed to provide answers to some theoretical and practical legal problems. In many respects, the social science tools of the time were not equal to the
theoretical tasks set out for them by the realists. 98 Moreover, the role
envisioned for empirical research in solving pressing legal issues far surpassed the boundaries of empirically verifiable phenomena. These frailties in means and goals resulted in a misuse of empiricism 99 and
disillusionment with the goals of the realist movement."m Whether legal
realism ever ceased as an intellectual movement is the subject of some
debate.001 Many would agree that legal realism survives, either as an
ideology that has not lost all of its followers, or as the progenitor of later

theories of law, such as the law and society or critical legal studies
movements. 102
C. Law and Society. Social Science and Public Policy
The law and society movement developed slowly from the sociological
branch of legal realism and continues today as a jurisprudential theory.10 3 Law and society adherents advocate using social science research
to shape solutions to legal problems. Thus, much law and society re97. See Cohen, JusticeHolmes and the Nature ofLaw, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 352, 357-60
(1931).
98. See Schlegel, supra note 94, at 460.
99. Realists even chided their own for sloppy scientism:
[I]t was at Yale that the nadir of idiocy was achieved when Underhill Moore
'tested out' whether law has mystical operation by an elaborate observation,
metering and statisticking of the noneffect on the parking practices of New
Haveners of a change in the official traffic regulations which he had arranged to
keep carefully from coming to the knowledge of any trafficker.
Llewellyn, On What Makes Legal Research Worth While, 8 J. Legal Educ. 399, 401

(1956).
100. See generally Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037

(1961) (illuminating flaws in realist philosophy). Felix Cohen, for example, recognized
the uncertainties of his own attempt to construct an ethical system from empirical premises and dispiritedly labeled his efforts a "failure." F. Cohen, Ethical Systems and Legal
Ideals: An Essay on the Foundations of Legal Criticism 227 (1933).
101. Compare L. Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale: 1927-1960, at 230 (1986)
("[i]ntellectually realism had not proved significant"), with Singer, Legal Realism Now
(Book Review), 76 Calif. L. Rev. 465, 467 (1988) ("To some extent, we are all realists
now"); see also Nowak, ResurrectingRealist Jurisprudence: The PoliticalBias of Burger

CourtJustices, 17 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 549, 550 (1983) ("It appears to me that it has become
quite trendy for constitutional law professors to claim to be legal realists but that only a
very small group of academics accept the [nihilistic] tenets of that jurisprudential
school.").
102. See, e.g., Friedman, The Law andSociety Movement, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 763, 764-65

(1986) (discussing roots of law and society movement in scholarly commentary that
viewed law in its social context).

103. See Lopucki, Bringing Realism to the Classroom (Book Review), 1987 Wis. L.

Rev. 641, 641-43. The parentage of the movement can be traced back even further, to the

1989]

LAW AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD

search examines the effect of law on social phenomena. 1°4 Theorists in
the movement hope for reciprocal social reform through institutional
legal change.105 Law and society scholars also try to broaden the definition of law-beyond law as authoritarian
principles to law as a creation
1 6
1
norms.
cultural
of prevailing
For law and society scholars, empiricism is more than verification; it is
a catalyst for legal problem solving. At the heart of law and society theory lies the conviction that an understanding of the law is possible only
within the context of the surrounding social environment. This contex-

tualism requires law and society adherents to explain a vast range of social complexities.10 7
Law and society researchers employ methods and borrow theories
from the social sciences, particularly the behavioral sciences.10 Their
inquiry focuses on the social effects of legal rules.10 9 Law and society not
only draws upon the results of social science research, but constructs its
jurisprudence on methodologically scientific grounds. Initially, law and
law-as-a-social-construct theories of Henry Sumner Maine and Max Weber. See Friedman, supra note 102, at 764.
104. See, e.g., Silbey & Sarat, CriticalTraditionsin Law and Society Research, 21 Law
& Soc'y Rev. 165, 165 (1987) ("Its focus has been decentering, concerned not with what
the law is but with what the law does." (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)).
105. See Sarat, Legal Effectiveness and Social Studies of Law: On the UnfortunatePersistance [sic] ofa Research Tradition,9 Leg. Stud. Forum 23, 25-27 (1985). The attitudinal differences between law and society work and critical legal studies are evidenced in
the charges of their respective critics. Law and society scholars are criticized as blindly
utopian for their faith in the power of laws. See Willens, Structure, Content and the
Exigencies of War: American Prison Law After Twenty-five Years 1962-1987, 37 Am.
U.L. Rev. 41, 67 n.140 (1987). "Crits," on the other hand, are assailed for negativism
and nihilism because of their irreverence toward legal constructs. See Sherwin, A Matter
of Voice and Plot: Beliefand Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 543, 56768 (1988); Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 332, 332-33 (1986).
106. See generallyMunger, Law, Change,and Litigation: A CriticalExamination ofan
EmpiricalResearch Tradition, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 57, 99 (1988) (functionalist theory of
litigation cannot be considered independent of framework of social organization within
which litigants act).
107. Theorists in the movement thus have undertaken broad, explanatory activities.
See, e.g., Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95, 149-51 (1974) (discussing way in which basic
structure of legal system both creates and limits the possibilities of using the system as a
means of redistributive change); Silbey & Bittner, The Availability of Law, 4 Law & Policy Q. 399, 400 (1982) (study of Massachussetts Attorney General's Office of Consumer
Protection that concludes that laws are not fully enforced, thus leaving great amounts of
discretion to law enforcement officers).
108. See Comment, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 Yale L.J. 1153, 1155
(1970). For an example of how law and society researchers use field studies to determine
the conditions that cause perceptions of procedural justice to vary, see Tyler, What Is
ProceduralJustice?: CriteriaUsed by Citizens to Assess the Fairnessof Legal Procedures,
22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 103, 110 (1988). Correlational analyses suggest that individual case
facts and psychiatric opinions, not judge's attitudes, are critical in civil commitment decisions. See Hiday, JudicialDecisions in Civil Commitment: Facts,Attitudes, and Psychiatric Recommendations, 17 Law & Soe'y Rev. 517, 520-26 (1983).
109. See Kissam, The Decline ofLaw School Professionalism, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 251,
299-300 (1986).
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society theorists acknowledge that social science experimentation does
not produce conclusive answers."1° This recognition of the tentative and
probabilistic nature of their conclusions comports with the scientific requirement of falsifiability."' Law and society endeavors are also fertile
or extensible;1 2 research conclusions not only prompt specific recommendations,1 13 but also inspire new research." 4
The scientific shortcomings of the law and society movement arise
from the subjective nature of its inquiries. The questions asked by law
and society scholars necessarily require interpretive answers.1 5 Further-

more, advocates of this approach must often draw subjective conclusions
from empirical results to construct positive programs.
D. Law and Economics: Scientific Utilitarianism"6
In the 1950s several theorists, working independently, began to analyze antitrust, corporation and securities law according to economic principles. " 7 This approach soon spread to other areas of law, such as tort,

criminal, constitutional and family law." 8 Economic analysts of law
seek to make law more efficient by importing economic tools and princi110. See Teitelbaum, An Overview ofLaw and Social Research, 35 J. Legal Educ. 465,
477 (1985). Theories that are tentative or falsifiable must be distinguished from theories
that are vague or lacking in criteria.
111. For a discussion of the meaning of scientific falsifiability, see supra notes 42-44
and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Jacob, Another Look at No-FaultDivorce and the Post-Divorce Finances
of Women, 23 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1989) (no fault divorce has limited impact on women's financial situation); Singer & McDowell, CriminalizingDelinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 521, 529-32
(1988) (laws providing adult penalties for juvenile offenders are ineffective in reducing
juvenile crime).
114. See, e.g., Berger, Searles & Neuman, The Dimensions ofRape Reform Legislation,
22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 329, 348-49 (1988) (calling for additional research into whether
state geographic or other sociocultural variables influence the reform of rape laws).
115. See Teitelbaum, supra note 110, at 477.
116. This label is a self-description by Richard Posner, one of the principal theorists in
the law and economics school. See Posner, The PresentSituationin Legal Scholarship, 90
Yale L.J. 1113, 1115 (1981).
117. See, e.g., Manne, Accountingfor ShareIssues UnderModern CorporationLaws, 54
Nw. U.L. Rev. 285 (1959) (examining stated capital requirements on share issues from
the point of view of both accountant and lawyer); Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 50 (1958) (analyzing conflicting interests in tying arrangements and setting forth criteria to determine when to apply a per se
rule). See generally Posner, The Chicago School ofAntitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev.
925 (1979) (the maturing of economics as a social science has greatly diminished the
distinctions between schools of antitrust policy).
118. See, e.g., G. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination 122-23 (1957) (applying
economic analysis to racial and religious discrimination); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 533 (1961) (applying economic
analysis to tort law); Ehrlich, Participationin Illegitimate Activities: An Economic Analysis, in Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 68, 111-12 (1974) (applying
economic analysis to criminal law); Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis
of Torts and Crimes, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 905, 906-29 (1985) (criticizing economic analysis
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ples into the study of law.1 19 The law and economics school confines its
inquiry to the study of allocative efficiency. The law and economics approach presumes that actors in the judicial system operate to maximize
wealth or utility; that they achieve maximization or efficiency through
cost-benefit analysis; and that general societal good is achieved when all
participants maximize concurrently. The goal of law and economics is to
explain how certain legal rules obstruct efficiency and to advance rules
that promote efficient resource allocation.
One aspect of the law and economics movement prescribes normative
solutions to specific legislative, regulatory and decisional controversies. 12 0 The positive branch of the law and economics movement tests its
efficiency hypotheses with reference to existing decisions.12 ' Excluded
from the law and economics framework are interdisciplinary methods,
designs and epistemologies. However, some efficiency theorists favor the
use of social science methods to evaluate the effect of legal rules and to
study legal theory.'2 2
Law and economics analysis satisfies several criteria of scientific inquiry. It is somewhat successful in proposing a falsifiable hypothesis:
testing the concrete working of allocative efficiency has produced a series
of tort and criminal law); Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 Yale
L.J. 1297, 1347-52 (1981) (applying economic analysis to law of warranties).
119. See Cooter, Law and the Imperialism of Economics: An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Law and a Review ofthe Major Books, 29 UCLA L. Rev. 1260, 1261-66
(1982); Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 283
(1979). One theorist, George Priest, originally proposed that the historic tendency of the
common law was to move toward economic efficiency in rule-selection and endurance.
See Priest, The Common Law Processand the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. Legal Stud.
65, 65 (1977). In later works, Priest refined and modified his views. See, e.g., Priest &
Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1984) (disputes are
selected for litigation efficiently, assuming litigants make rational evaluations of the probable outcome); Priest, Selective Characteristicsof Litigation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399, 400
(1980) ("[Bloth precedential and judicial influence are constrained by litigation-settlement decisions in ways that make difficult the identification of a general and systematic
influence of any basis of decision making from the content of judicial decisions alone.").
120. See, eg., Landes & Posner, Jointand Multiple Tortfeasors: An EconomicAnalysis,
9 J. Legal Stud. 517, 519-20 (1980) (analyzing common law contribution rule in terms of
economic efficiency); Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61,
98-101 (1971) (economic analysis of criminal justice system and of proposals for reform);
Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J.
Legal Stud. 399, 400-06 (1973) (analyzing roles of legal system and substantive legal rules
in promoting economic efficiency).
121. See, e.g., Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972) (formulating
and testing theory to explain the social function of negligence concept by analyzing samples of leading cases).
122. See, e.g., Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1, 43 (1960) (proposing the construction of economic models that would "start our analysis with a situation approximating that which actually exists,

. .

. examine the effects of a proposed

policy change and. . . attempt to decide whether the new situation would be, in total,
better or worse than the original one"); Posner, supra note 14, at 779 (suggesting that
legal theory should be analyzed "'from the outside,' using the methods of scientific and
humanistic inquiry to enlarge our knowledge of the legal system").
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of results.123 Law and economics has also proved to be unusually fertile;
its supporters have proposed the application of economic theory to family law, constitutional theory and criminal law.124 Maximization principles provide the backdrop for public choice theory. 2 5
While law and economics permits puzzle-solving within the context of
a structured paradigm, the framework is unscientific. Initially, it must be
recognized that the positive branch of the law and economics movement
uses a utilitarian type of policy analysis, 2 6 rather than attempting to apply certain natural science techniques to the study of law. A serious difficulty with this approach is that it provides a closed model that reduces
most conceptual considerations to the issue of efficiency. 27
Critical scholars strongly dispute the normative appeal of the law and
economics model because prescriptive economics fails to assign importance to policy considerations such as disparities in wealth or resource
123. See generally the articles in Volume 8 of the Hofstra Law Review, Symposium on
Efficiency. Specific examples include Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract
Efficient?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 711, 712-14 (1980) (rejecting notion that private property
and contract law are presumptively efficient); Kornhauser, A Guide to the Perplexed
Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 591, 609-10, 633-34 (1980) (questioning both the notion of efficiency promotion as the purpose of legal rules and the descriptive value of law and economics' efficiency model); Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8
Hofstra L. Rev. 641, 658 (1980) (questioning ability to empirically verify efficiency of
legal rules). More recent critiques include Stout, The Unimportanceof Being Efficient:
An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L.
Rev. 613, 692-95 (1988) (efficient stock market not crucial to efficient allocation of resources), and Wolcher, The Accommodation of Regret in ContractRemedies, 73 Iowa L.
Rev. 797 (1988) (rejecting law and economics' theory of efficient breach). But see infra
note 132 and accompanying text.
124. See G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (1976); Becker,
Landes & Michael, An Economic Analysis of MaritalInstability, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 1141
(1977); Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169
(1968); see also Posner, supra note 14, at 767 ("There is an economics of accidents and
accident law, of the family and family law, of property rights and property law, of finance
and corporations, even of free speech and the first amendment, and so on through almost
the whole law school curriculum.").
125. Public choice theory involves the application of law and economics principles to
the political process. It proposes that all legislative activity involves interest groups attempting to engage in a form of interest maximization. See, ag., Brennan & Buchanan, Is
Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 Va. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1988)
(analyzing behavior of political actors according to economic model); Macey, Competing
Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 76 (1987) (analyzing
structure of the Constitution as imposing structural limitations on interest group "rent
seeking"); Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 339 (1988) (survey of
the economic theory of legislation); cf Kelman, On Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical
Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical"Practiceof the Public Choice Movement, 74 Va.
L. Rev. 199, 224 (1988) (questioning the empirical precision of public choice theory in
such subsections as "Is everybody rent-seeking because everything's called rentseeking?").
126. See Posner, supra note 119, at 282-83. Economic analysis "seeks to 'import' into
the law a unified body of thought." Merges, supra note 9, at 326.
127. See Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law (Book
Review), 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1447, 1471 (1987).
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distribution.1 2 Commentators question, in terms ranging from polite
dissent to incredulity, a view of the legal system that promotes allocative
efficiency to the exclusion of other economic and social goals. 12 9 While
positive economic analysis introduces quantitative reasoning to legal decisions, it suffers from deficiencies as a scientific method that limit its
explanatory force.
Many assumptions of normative law and economics are either untested
or called into doubt by empirical testing. For example, economists assume that individuals make choices that maximize self-interest. Explanations for this basic assumption, however, are sadly lacking. Some
scholars refute this hypothesis by suggesting that consumers often make
undesirable personal choices.1 30 Second, normative law and economics'
derivation of legal solutions through cost-benefit analysis is far from an
objective mathematical process. As James Boyle points out, "cost-benefit
analysts can smuggle in their preferences and thus give their tinkering

with the existing distribution of wealth the sham rigor of scientific rationality." 13 1 Third, when legal facts or rules fail to comport with economic
theory, efficiency theorists suggest that the rules should be changed to
conform with the theory.1 32 This seriously limits the opportunity to disprove efficiency theory. Thus, law and economics theory fails to comport
with the criterion of falsifiability.
128. See generally Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 388 (1981) (liberal law and economics scholars concede that
other factors such as distributional equity may rival efficiency as a guiding choice in
particular cases); cf.Calabresi, supra note 118, at 505 (formulating theory on economically efficient distribution of risk of loss). For the proposition that any such assignment
of values gerryrigs the results, see Binder, Beyond Criticism, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 888, 900
(1988) ("[R]esources cannot be distributed on the basis of calculations of allocative efficiency because such calculations always depend on prior assumptions about the distribution of resources.").
129. See, eg., Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A
Buyer's Guide to Posner'sEconomicAnalysis ofLaw, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1655, 1657 (1974)
(law and economics "almost completely filters out issues of equity"). Polinsky later
changed his mind. He now believes that matters of equity should be addressed through
the tax and social welfare systems. See A.M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and
Economics 119-27 (2d ed. 1989).
130. See, eg., Gintis, Consumer Behaviorand the Concept ofSovereignty: Explanations
of Social Decay, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 267, 270 (1972) (advertising and other forms of
psychic manipulation impel consumers to choose what is not in their own interest); Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 769, 778 (examining the neo-classicist tautology that "[o]ne is best off... when one gets what one chooses because one chooses what
makes one best off").
131. Boyle, The Politics of Reason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought,
133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 700 (1985).
132. See, e.g., Tushnet, Post-RealistLegal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 1383, 1389
("when faced with rules that depart from what their analysis shows would promote allocative efficiency, these scholars find it hard to resist the temptation to urge that the rules
be altered"). Comparatively, truly scientific theories are modifiable. "The scientist is
ready to abandon a theory when the data collected demand that he does so ....When
generalizations conflict with the phenomena, he 'saves the phenomena.'" J. Feibleman,
supra note 20, at 55.
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Subsidiary difficulties include the failure of the model's assumptions to
correspond with social or judicial reality, x3 3 to account for non-economic
preferences and to guide moral choices.13 1 While an economic model
might offer tremendous predictive power, 135 its flaws undermine the usefulness of the result. Fundamentally, law and economics is a technology,
not a science. Its object is to increase efficiency, while the general aim of
more general and comprehensive theoscience is to unfold increasingly
1 36
ries about its subjects.
E. CriticalLegal Studies: Analytic Empiricism and Demythology
The critical legal studies (CLS) movement 137 was founded in 1977 by a
group of scholars who were disappointed by the strict "empirico-behaviorist" approach of the Law and Society Association. 13 These scholars
initially relied on philosophers and social theorists, such as Jurgen
Habermas, Georg Hegel, Martin Heidegger, Gyorgy Lukacs and Karl
139
Mannheim, to argue that law is a construct of its social surroundings
and that legal doctrines reflect, solidify and legitimate existing political
and social hierarchies." 4 The CLS critique is deeper than an attack on
the power of rules to resolve disputes; it also suggests that patterns and
133. See generally Balkin, supra note 127 (law and economics theory assailed because
its underlying assumptions are unrealistic); see also Tushnet, supra note 132, at 1393
("the real world is not Pareto-optimal").
134. See Markovits, Legal Analysis and the Economic Analysis of Allocative Efficiency,
8 Hofstra L. Rev. 811, 826 n.15 (1980).
135. Indeed, law and economics adherents share the realists' single criterion of predictiveness for evaluating the worth of their model. See, e.g., R. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law 13 (2d ed. 1977) ("The true test of a theory is its utility in predicting or explaining
reality."). Regarding the scientific value of predictive power, see supra notes 29-30 and
accompanying text.
136. See S. Toulmin, supra note 18, at 14-15; see also Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 469
("all scientific activity is meant to result directly or indirectly in changes of the body of
knowledge").
137. Adherents to critical theory are far from a unified band of thinkers. See, e.g.,
Dalton, Book Review, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 229, 231-39 (1983) (delineating distinctions
between CLS reformists and irrationalists); Stick, Charting the Development of Critical
LegalStudies (Book Review), 88 Colum. L. Rev. 407, 407-08 (1988) (referring to a dominant tradition of emphasis on indeterminacy and legitimation and a less cohesive countertradition that focuses on other aspects of the politics of law); Williams, CriticalLegal
Studies: The Death of Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 429, 472-91 (1987) (distinguishing between classical CLS' application of structuralist theory to law and more recent irrationalist claims that law is illegitimate because it is
not neutral).
138. See Hutchinson & Monahan, Law, Politics,and the CriticalLegal Scholars: The
Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 199, 200 (1984).
139. See generally Boyle, The Politics ofReason: CriticalLegal Theory and Local Social Thought, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 685, 721-30 (1985) (describing influence of Marxist
thinkers on current CLS theories).
140. See generally R. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement (1986) (criticizing
current legal theories); Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in The Politics of
Law 281, 288 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) (legal concepts "have been built by elites who have
thought they had some stake in rationalizing their dominant power positions, so they
have tended to define rights in such a way as to reinforce existing hierarchies of wealth
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methods of legal reasoning are inherently indeterminate and reified. 4
Some CLS theorists advance a more modest version of the indeterminacy claim-that the explanatory force of legal reasoning is limited and
incomplete.142 Thus, CLS challenges established deterministic views of
the universe and formulates a social vision of choice. CLS jurisprudence
argues that individuals can shape social institutions. 143
CLS scholars are divided about the role of empiricism in legal theory.
The rejection of determinism has led some to dismiss empiricism as well,
because social science appears targeted toward the discovery of causal

laws.144 They insist that focusing on empirical inquiry will mystify law
in the same way that religion or literature clouds fundamental political
choices. Science can provide only textual interpretation, which itself ultimately becomes hypostatized. 45 In this view, science's promise of objec-

tivity is an illusion-it masks underlying political choices about the
selection of hypotheses, methods of observations, the interpretation of
data and even the very subjects of scientific study.' 4 6
Some critical scholars lament that empirical work fails to answer fundamental policy questions, 4 7 is unable to deliver any vision of social
and privilege"). This view has been diluted to little more than a base critique that "law is
politics." Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2 (1986).
141. See Hutchinson & Monahan, supra note 138, at 206-07; see also Kennedy, Form
andSubstance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1766-76 (1976) (discussing conflict between theory that law consists of rational rules and theory that law
cannot be reduced to rules); Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 Yale
L.J. 1205, 1213 (1981) ("The truly pressing, and endemic, difficulty is indeterminacy.").
142. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 Yale
L.L 1, 6 (1984) ("By its own criteria, legal reasoning cannot ... explain how the legal
system works or how judges decide cases.").
143. See Gordon, supra note 140, at 290.
144. See Whitford, Lowered Horizons: Implementation Research in a Post-CLS World,
1986 Wis. L. Rev. 755, 758.
145. In the Critical legal view, empirical researchers who spend years analyzing
the answers to complicated surveys about disputes are like madmen wandering
in an asylum that they themselves have constructed. Though they believe they
are in touch with "reality," such researchers live in a set of false constructs
whose pernicious social effect they themselves have strengthened through their
analytic categories ....For the Critical scholar, the pretense that social science
methods lead to objective and value neutral knowledge hides an implicit and
conservative political message behind a neutral and technocratic facade.
Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricism, 36 Stan. L. Rev.
575, 617-18 (1984). Deconstructionist philosopher Richard Rorty suggests that arriving
at objective truth through scientific study is impossible, and that science simply forms
part of the current story of reality. See R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
315-94 (1979); Husson, Expanding the Legal Vocabulary: The Challenge Posed by the
Deconstruction and Defense of Law, 95 Yale L.J. 969, 973 n.24 (1986).
146. David Trubek crafted the seminal work on critical legal studies and empiricism.
He carefully studied the different aspects of empiricism-as techniques, determinism, and
as nondoctrinal study. See Trubek, supra note 145, at 579-85. After detailing the
hazards of viewing empirical work as no more than deterministic positivism, Trubek finds
a place in critical legal studies for scientific studies to support pragmatic analyses of legal
practice. See id. at 619-22.
147. See Kelman, Trashing, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 293, 339-40 (1984).
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Other CLS theorists

are hopeful that empirical research will substantiate CLS claims.150 Still
others use the results of empirical studies to bolster their conclusions, 5 '

but fear a generalized and uncritical acceptance of science.' 52
53
Critics of CLS attack the high level of abstraction in critical theory.'
The methods used by a number of CLS scholars, however, are strikingly
organized and analytic. They endeavor to arrive at concept specificity, to
analyze the constituent elements of ideas and to test theories against historical realities. For example, one technique employed by critical theorists is deconstruction, which breaks arguments underlying a rule of law
into their constituent elements to show how those elements actually support the opposite rule.' 5 4 As an analytic tool, deconstructive practice can
illuminate the nature and meaning of legal rules. As a method of epistemological inquiry, deconstruction can expose the ideologies that shape
those rules.' 55
Several CLS scholars have engaged in systematic empirical 5 6 analyses
of the legitimating effect of certain legal doctrines. 157 William Whitford
148. See id. at 341-42.
149. See Stick, supra note 137, at 420-21.
150. See Trubek, supra note 145, at 584-615; see also Klare, Labor Law as Ideology:
Toward a New Historiographyof Collective BargainingLaw, 4 Indus. Rel. L.J. 450, 452
n.6 (1981) (critical labor law has neglected empirical approach); Tushnet, Introduction,
52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 239, 241 (1984) ("because CLS seeks to critique all versions of
formalism... its task can never be concluded").
151. See, e.g., Gabel & Harris, BuildingPower &BreakingImages: CriticalLegal Theory and the PracticeofLaw, 11 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 369, 375-76, 381-84 (198283). Peter Gabel and Paul Harris call for the application of critical strategies to the
practice of law and employ case studies to supply proof that this practical application of
theory is viable. See id.
152. See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 147, at 302 (describing quantitative accounts of particular CLS reform packages); id. at 303-04 (yet denying the existence of objectively
knowable "facts"); id. at 338 (and exhibiting apprehension about the determinist program
of scientific endeavors such as sociobiology). As a practical matter, once critical scholars
have empirical data to support their theoretical propositions, it would be unwise not to
use it.
153. See Diamond, Not-So-CriticalLegal Studies, 6 Cardozo L. Rev. 693, 694 (1985);
Schwartz, With Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS-Land, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 413, 41920 (1984).
154. See Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743, 744
(1987).
155. See id. at 755.
156. By "empirical" I mean evaluative of the impact of rules on behavior.
157. See Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 1049 (1978); Klare,
JudicialDeradicalizationof the WagnerAct and the Originsof Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978). Freeman and Klare document how
Supreme Court interpretations of the fourteenth amendment and the Wagner Act, respectively, created a repressively tolerant legal atmosphere that limited the transformative impact of the civil rights and labor movements. Klare demonstrated that benevolent
Court decisions during the labor movement, while appearing to confer benefits on labor,
actually created a structure in which "unions were treated as guarantors of productivity
and enforcers of work-discipline, and the chasm separating union leadership from the
rank and file was widened." Klare, supra,at 336. Similarly, Freeman establishes that the
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has offered one of the more thoughtful approaches to the compatibility of
empirical research with critical theory. Whitford endorses research into
changes in social behavior caused by legal constructs.15 8 Further, Whitford explains that implementation research can steer past the Scylla of
indeterminacy and the Charybdis of determinism, if such research is undertaken with an awareness of its contingent and probabilistic nature.15 9

Finally, critical scholars have taken an unprecedented role in criticizing the application of the scientific model to law. In a distinctly scientific
fashion, CLS' predecessors questioned the explanatory power of a social
sciences model of law. According to philosophers such as Jacques Derrida and anthropologists such as Clifford Gertz, science offered yet another narrative-a story of law-rather than a key to objective truths
about law. 1" Some CLS theorists thus have emphasized textual or literary analysis as a superior method of analyzing the meanings of legal writings.161 In the face of accusations of mushy technique, certain critical
legal scholars have demanded rigor in theory-building. 6 2 Critical legal
studies, more than other theories of jurisprudence, is intensely and criti-

cally self-evaluative. CLS theory is truly multidisciplinary in its ori-

gins, 163 drawing upon philosophy, art, literature, anthropology and
sociology. Moreover, critical legal studies is extensible; the focus of critical theory is to embrace more phenomena by putting law into explana-

tory relations with other aspects of social behavior.
Court's treatment of each successive discrimination case as a discrete and surprising instance of a violation effectively neutralized collective sentiment on the part of victims
concerning the need for more radical restructuring of discrimination laws. See Freeman,
supra, at 1056-57.
158. See Whitford, supra note 144, at 759.
159. "I am prepared to accept the critique [of determinism] to the extent that it rejects
a timeless, natural law of the social order. It is quite another matter, however, to assert
that there are no time-bounded, momentary consistencies in human social behavior that
can be anticipated with considerable reliability." Id.
160. See Williams, supra note 137, at 455.
161. See, e.g., Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 275 (1989); Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 373 (1982); Weisberg, Text into Theory: A Literary Approach
to the Constitution, 20 Ga. L. Rev. 939 (1986).
162. See, e.g., Munger & Seron, CriticalLegal Studies Versus CriticalLegal Theory: A
Comment on Method, 6 Law & Pol'y 257, 270 (1984).
Instead of guiding inquiry, we have found theory used in [critical legal studies]
research, as in liberal legal research, to justify the continued reliance on exegesis
of doctrine as a research method without seriously challenging or testing the
premises of such a method. Too often, Marxist theory is cited as if it made
basic research on political economy unnecessary rather than central, and too
often it is cited to explain the significance of doctrinal developments which by
themselves do not support the theory.
Id.
163. See Turley, The Hitchiker's Guide to CLS, Unger, and Deep Thought, 81 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 593, 595-96 (1987). It thus possesses external validity. See supra note 39.
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The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism: PracticalReason and Ineffability

What began centuries ago as a theory of moral reasoning 1" has been
regentrified recently as16' a5 philosophy of jurisprudence. Variously labeled
"practical reasoning,"
"practical legal studies" 16' 6 and "the jurispru6
7
dence of skepticism,"'
this school of thought focuses on decisional
methodology-"how judges decide cases and how judges should decide
cases" -- and the ethics of legal practice,' 6 9 rather than on the nature of

law or the structure of the legal system. Not surprisingly, those who
espofise practical reason disagree on its definition. One of the initial theorists in the area, Vincent Wellman, distinguishes practical reason from
deductive and analogical reasoning and defines it as "the reasoning of
ends to means."'' 7 0 Richard Posner views practical reason as "the methods that people who are not credulous-who have inquiring minds-use
to form beliefs about matters that cannot be verified by logic or exact
observation."' 17 1 According to its adherents, practical reason supplies the
decisional methodology when formal7 2 logic and scientific observation
alone cannot provide legal solutions.1
Supporters of practical reason are quick to recognize that they must
explain its method and offer criteria for evaluating its success. However,
in relation to the volume of impassioned arguments about the need for
practical reason, 173 explanations of its techniques are largely unvoiced or
164. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 148-59 (Irwin trans. 1985); see also Wiggins,
Deliberationand PracticalReason, in A. Rorty, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics 221 (1980)
(discussing Aristotle's views of deliberation, choice and practical reason as set out in the
Nicomachean Ethics).
165. Wellman, PracticalReasoning and JudicialJustification: Toward an Adequate
Theory, 57 U. Colo. L. Rev. 45, 46 (1985).
166. Feinman, supra note 10, at 724.
167. See Posner, supra note 10, at 827. Richard Posner was an early champion of the
law and economics movement. Nowhere in his article does Posner attempt explicitly to
reconcile the fundamental assumptions of efficiency analysis with the methodology of
practical reason. Perhaps this is because Posner views the "skeptical mood" engendered
by practical reason as "[p]erspective-not theory." Id. at 829. Implicit in Posner's practical reason paradigm is the choice, at the outset, of a judging model. "A popular candidate for such a concept today is the economic concept of wealth maximization, but it is,
needless to say, a contestable choice." Id. at 863.
168. Feinman, supra note 10, at 724.
169. See generally Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835 (1987) (considering reasons why people choose to pursue legal careers).
170. Wellman, supra note 165, at 46.
171. Posner, supra note 10, at 838.
172. See id. at 830-37. Practical reason comprises "the methods ...that people use to
make a practical or ethical choice." Id. at 837.
173. Most recently, Justice William Brennan added his powerful voice in support of a
particular brand of practical reason. See Brennan, Reason, Passion,and "The Progressof
the Law" 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 (1988). Lest Justice Brennan's call for more humane
judging be mistaken simply as a plea for visceral jurisprudence, Professors Martha Minow and Elizabeth Spelman have attempted to clarify that reason and passion-wearing
various definitional garb-do not present an uncompromising dichotomy. See Minow &
Spelman, Passionfor Justice, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 37 (1988). They also delineate tentative
criteria for judging that employs passion yet does not abandon reason. See id. at 50-60.
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fuzzy. Posner, for example, has sketched the process used by a judge
employing practical reason: first, the judge develops an overall concept
or framework to guide her decision; 174 second, she examines relevant
precedents; third, she makes a policy determination guided by the chosen
paradigm; finally, the judge reviews the decision to ensure that it does not
conflict with precedent. 175 Since the first step of the method involves the
unconstrained choice of a judging paradigm and because all policy
choices follow from this paradigm, the process prescribed only choreographs how a judge implements whatever social vision she already possesses. Unfortunately, the analysis pretends to be more than descriptive.
Posner, Wellman, Kronman and others firmly advocate the use of practical reason as a prescriptive methodology.17 6
Posner's brand of practical reason, for example, "includes anecdote,
introspection, imagination, common sense, intuition..., empathy, imputation of motives, speaker's authority, metaphor, analogy, precedent, custom, memory, 'induction' . . . [and] 'experience.' "177 Most of these
forms of reasoning rely on subjective methods of perception that are not
measurable, let alone testable or falsiflable. All suffer from subjectivity
and unassailable self-sufficiency and cannot be publicly verified. Certain
criteria, such as memory and common sense, encourage reliance on accumulated lore of a specifically nonscientific nature. 178 Others, such as imagination and analogy, may provide the beginnings of scientific evidence,
but also may include elements that escape criteria of verification.
Importantly, the "methods" proposed to shape a decision based on
practical reason emphasize sources of knowledge, rather than process,
methods or results. Such a focus-on sources of knowledge, as opposed
to process-historically has been associated with unassailable decrees,
religion and dogmatic writings.17 9 Theories that are more scientific stress
These criteria for judging are more means-directive than those proposed by either Wellman or Posner. The criteria, which require openness of process, adaptiveness to new
situations and recognition of internal biases, see id., are also more scientific.
174. See Posner, supra note 10, at 863. Essentially, this amounts to the adoption of a
judging paradigm, such as law and economics.
175. See id.
176. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 10, at 1652-56; Kronman, Alexander Bickel's
Philosophy of Prudence, 94 Yale L.J. 1567, 1614-16 (1985); Posner, supra note 10, at 891;
Wellman, supra note 165, at 115.
177. Posner, supra note 10, at 838.
178. "Common sense has often been described as a compost of fragmented, superficial,
and sometimes inconsistent beliefs; as more concerned with immediate practical success
than with explanation and verification of beliefs; and as more inclined to change because
of sufficient social causes than because of sufficient scientific reasons." Levit, supra note
19, at 136.
179. Cf H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modem Science 1300-1800, at 89-90 (1957)
(relationship between intellectuals and clergy inhibited development of science in middle
ages); see also M. Bunge, supra note 32, at 241 ("The traditionalist approach to learning
presupposes that basic (or perhaps all of) human knowledge is locked in certain texts,
whether sacred or secular."). Reliance on scientific methodology can also be viewed as
involving political choices, not in the sense of favoring the ideology of a partisan group,
but in the sense of favoring public verification and full inquiry.
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procedure; theories that are less so encourage reliance on the locus of
knowledge as a definitive measure of the theory's worth.1 80 In short, the

methods of practical reason lie in a domain from which science, by definition, is largely excluded.
Wellman offers a somewhat different account of the operation of prac-

tical reason. For him, assessment of the validity of any problem-solving
by way of practical reason involves the measure of "satisfactoriness"whether the decision serves a set of predetermined wants or purposesand "satisfaction"-whether the decision has accomplished its purpose.18 1 One troublesome aspect of Wellman's methodology is the vaporous nature of his "criteria," which themselves specify no standards for
evaluating the worth of a decision and no public criteria for the selection
of purposes.18 2 More troubling is the illogic of the two measures. Satisfactoriness is defined solely as a measure of effectiveness. Satisfaction, a
purportedly independent gauge of a decision's worth, is actually subsumed in the initial criterion of satisfactoriness, and refers to no external
barometer for validation.
Scholars of practical reason engage in a curious dance with science.
Its advocates generally side-step the logical and deductive methods of
science. Some recognize that empirical methods are hostile to the notion
of reliance on "seasoned know-how." ' 3 Others reject scientific models,
tests and methods as too cumbersome for the realities of legal practice
and decisionmaking and conclude that science cannot be depended on to
answer value questions."8 4
Ironically, one challenge to practical reason is that it smacks of scientism. 8 5 However, the accusation that practical reason suffers from an
180. Science eschews resting beliefs on transcendental sources, hallowed figures, great
minds or customs-in other words, on any source of beliefs. Scientific possibilities are
always candidates to be tested. See generally P. Achinstein, The Concept of Evidence
(1983) (essays discussing (or presupposing) that scientific methods and trials, not origins
or sources of belief, provide authority and credibility); H. Redner, The Ends of Science:
An Essay in Scientific Authority 105-06 (1987) (changes in scientific thinking can occur
only through process of rational experimentation and cannot be dictated solely by any
authority or power).
181. See Wellman, supra note 165, at 90-92.
182. Regarding the scientific value of openness as a measure of a theory's worth, see
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
183. Kronman, supra note 176, at 1606-07.
184. See Posner, supra note 10, at 836-37.
185. Posner's skepticisms, like those expressed in some Critical Legal Studies, depend on the scientific criteria of objectivity and determinacy. The undefended
premise is that these orthodox scientific standards are among the necessary criteria for the existence and identification of the law. Posner's arguments for
legal skepticism fail if scientific criteria do not govern law and judicial practice
at all.
Burton, Judge Posner'sJurisprudence of Skepticism, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 710, 713 (1988)
(footnote omitted). This Article makes the claim that practical reason fails as a decisional methodology if scientific criteria, properly applied, do govern law and judicial
practice. See supra text accompanying notes 177-182. In fairness, Professor Burton does
recognize that by advocating a jurisprudence grounded on practical reasoning Posner is
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attempt to arrive at objectivity is misplaced. The charge that practical
reason is deterministic does not necessarily mean that it is either unscientific or scientific-but-helpful.186
Practical reason is not without normative content. Its advocates make
assumptions about the nature of law and use practical reason to suggest
adoption of certain principles or doctrines. Fundamentally, practical
reason betrays a disappointment in logical reasoning 8 7 and at the extreme, a distrust of rationality.18 8 In part because it lacks any forwardthinking social vision, practical reason also fosters an inherently conservative approach to change: "The premise of prudentialism is that
gradual reform within the framework of existing institutions is almost
always preferable to more dramatic and discontinuous modes of change
that seek to replace one entire framework with another." 18 9
The conservative bent of practical reason does not end with its approach to conceptual innovation. Practical reason calls for reliance on
intuition, visceral reactions and gut-level common sense. It also necessarily involves political choices by legal decisionmakers. 190 The federal
bench is stocked with "conservative" judges,1 91 whose judgment calls
and policy selections are influenced by their political visions.1 92 The acabandoning a "formerly strict logical positivism." Burton, supra, at 713. However, Burton curiously accuses Posner at once of "[r]ejecting a scientific approach to judging," id.
at 712, and depending on it. See id. at 713.
186. Determinism simply describes the notion that natural events have causes. See E.
Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modem Physics xi (1956). Indeed determinacy promotes continued examination to unearth the existence of causal relations.
187. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 10, at 828 ("Many-though certainly not most, and
perhaps only a tiny fraction-of the legal questions in our system ...

are not merely

difficult, but impossible, to answer by the methods of legal reasoning."); Wellman, supra
note 165, at 65 (referring to deduction as "mechanical jurisprudence" that is "inadequate
to explain the myriad ways in which judges use legal rules to rationalize their decisions");
id. at 84 (referring to analogical reasoning as lacking in criteria, and failing to provide
"any useful normative insights").
188. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 169, at 876 ("the rationalization of the law is likely
to turn us all, those who teach the law as well as those who make and practice it, into
bureaucratic functionaries, characterless experts whose work requires knowledge, precision, and fairness, but never judgment in the sense that I have used that term here").
Apparently Kronman fears the link of rationality with rationalization, the transformation
of rationalization into bureaucratization, and a consequent loss of some ineffable human
qualities, which he loosely collects under the heading of judgment.
189. Kronman, supra note 176, at 1609.
190. "[T]here is an open area in judging that judges can fill only by bringing in policy
preferences, ethical values, and the like .... ." Posner, supra note 10, at 864.
191. See, e.g., Goldman, Reagan's JudicialLegacy: Completing the Puzzle and Sum-

ming Up, 72 Judicature 318, 318-19 (1989) ("when Ronald Reagan left office in 1989, his
judicial legacy literally was 346, or 47 per cent, of the judges in active service on Article
III courts of general jurisdiction"). Regarding the conservative agenda promoted by
these judges, see Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, 10 Nat'l L.J. 22 (April 18,
1988) (the Reagan appointees are "predominately white, male and wealthy").
192. See Estreicher, Conservingthe FederalJudiciaryfor a ConservativeAgenda? (Book

Review), 84 Mich. L. Rev. 569, 569-70 (1986). Stephen Griffin suggests that institutional
constraints apart from partisan politics keep constitutional theory "fundamentally conservative. Scholars tend to avoid areas of inquiry where the Court does not or cannot go.
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ceptance of practical reason would exacerbate the extent to which legal
decisions would conform to the prevailing political mood. By emphasizing conventional wisdom based on common experience and values,19 3
practical reason relies on majoritarian definitions of "practical wisdom"
or "sound judgment."19 4
At best, practical reason is ill-defined. As a tool to assess the validity
of any particular decision, it is reminiscent of Justice Potter Stewart's test
for the recognition of pornographic material.19 5 Any decisional methodology that depends upon intuition cannot describe how to resolve conflicts among competing values. 196 As an apparatus to guide decisionmaking, it is an illusion.1 97
This section has offered examples of how the criteria of validation can
be employed to critique theories ofjurisprudence. Occasionally, scholars
use isolated principles of the scientific method to shape or criticize theories or decisions.198 Theorists have failed, however, to make comprehenAs a result, the Court largely determines the parameters of scholarly debate." Griffin,
What is ConstitutionalTheory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 493, 531 (1989).
193. See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 10, at 1653 (practical reason in the context
of judicial review is circumscribed by, among other things, "our traditions of constitutional exegesis... [and] the expectations of the society in general and the legal community in particular"); Kromnan, supra note 10, at 205-07 (practicing lawyers concern
themselves with the particulars of their cases, rather than with more general theoretical
approaches to law); Posner, supra note 10, at 854-55 ("[the test of time] is a refinement of
the idea that whatever most people think is probably true").
194. Mark Tushnet makes the stronger claim that practical reason is not centrist, but
elitist because "[t]hose who, in our society's terms, are better educated, more independent, and so on, are likely to have the faculty of practical reason better developed."
Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theory, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1502, 1536
(1985).
195. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I
know it when I see it."); see also B. Woodward & S. Armstrong, The Brethren 15-16
(1979) (discussing Justice Stewart's remark in the context of his possible promotion to
Chief Justice).
196. See Tushnet, supra note 194, at 1532.
197. See supra notes 177-182 and accompanying text (discussion of the absence of external criteria to guide decisionmaking).
198. See, e.g., Bendixsen, Enforcing the Duty to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under a Collective BargainingAgreement Rejected in Bankruptcy: Preservingthe Parties'Bargainand
NationalLabor Policy, 8 Indus. Rel. L.J. 401, 442 (1986) (invoking the principle of simplicity to suggest adoption of one of two competing theories of arbitration duties); Clarke,
The FiduciaryObligationsof Lenders in Leveraged Buyouts, 54 Miss. L.J. 423, 426 (1984)
(arguing that fiduciary concepts as opposed to alter ego, negligence, instrumentality and
agency theories, offer the most fertile possibilities for analyzing potential corporate creditor liability because of the flexibility of fiduciary principles); Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1696, 1704 (1986) (suggesting that alternatives to efficiency
analyses in antitrust are not workable and proposing that "[w]e take Occam's Razor and
slice off ideas that cannot contribute to useful legal rules"); Halpern, Application of the
Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability: Searchingfor "The Wisdom of Solomon", 135
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1123, 1157 n. 140 (1987) (referring to the limited extensibility of the use of
impracticability and frustration doctrines in a certain contract dispute due to the lack of a
conceptual framework for extending the doctrines beyond the single case).
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sive and consistent use of these criteria to evaluate the logic, utility,
explanatory and exploratory power of jurisprudential theories.
III. THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
METATHEORY: LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF LAW AND
SCIENCE

Any theory ofjurisprudence may be evaluated according to the criteria
of scientific inquiry. These criteria provide a common analytical framework that can be applied to all theories. Equally important, the history
of the treatment of science by different schools of jurisprudence offers
certain collective messages: about the utility of interdisciplinary thought,
about formalism and about grand theory-building.
Initially and perhaps most importantly, the historical sweep of law and
science attests to the necessity of interdisciplinary thinking. The interaction of the two disciplines has offered new and substantially different
ways of viewing perennial legal problems, both in terms of specific conceptual transplants and broader theoretical approaches. For example,
the Heisenberg uncertainty principle-which postulates that it is impossible to determine simultaneously the velocity and the location of a subatomic particle because the act of determining one characteristic makes
uncertain the determination of the otherl 9 9 -has been applied to the process 20
of constitutional adjudication 2" and the allocation of contract
risks. 1
More broadly, the advance of scientific theorizing has led to greater
refinement in the development of jurisprudential theories. Classical
thought was flawed by the formalism of its method, which relied on the
proposition that legal rules are an unchanging and transcendent body of
doctrine. Later theories, such as realism, law and society and critical
legal studies, exhibit increasing depth-a recognition that legal rules are
not reducible solely to observable phenomena, but are a product of underlying forces, such as creativity, politics, or empathy.
Another message from the history of science in law concerns how jurisprudential theorists search for knowledge, understanding and greater
explanatory power, and why those searches fail. Classical thought, and
to some extent law and society scholarship, offer examples of how science
can be used as mystique rather than reason. While both schools exhibit
faith in science's ability to deliver objective and systemic solutions to
legal issues, neither recognizes that it is mistaking the prestige of science
for the benefits that scientific inquiry has to offer in evaluating arguments, objectives or conclusions. Critical legal studies, on the other
hand, manifests a healthy, skeptical attitude toward existing legal rules.
199. See W. Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond 81 (1971).
200. See Bradley, The UncertaintyPrinciplein the Supreme Court, 1986 Duke L.J. 1, 2
n.5.

201. See Seita, Uncertainty and ContractLaw, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, 77 n.5 (1984).
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As a theoretical venture, however, CLS does not build upon its own conclusions. Most critical theorists offer no positive program for better decisionmaking; some suggest that such a goal is inherently unattainable.
Thus, CLS theorists do not put the criteria of scientific inquiry to their
greatest possible use. The utility of scientific inquiry should neither be
exalted beyond its bounds, nor should its possible contributions be
underestimated.
Unlike theories of science, in which knowledge is necessarily cumulative (although marked at times by leaps and lapses), 2 legal theories appear to change in paradigm shifts."0 3 Many theories of jurisprudence are
defined by a rejection of what has gone before." 4 Some theorists pride
themselves on the fact that their theories do not resemble or converge

with prior legal thinking. The collective history of legal philosophy is
one of fragmentation and atomism, not of comprehensiveness or depth.
The progression of jurisprudence has been distinctly unscientific.2"'
Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from this view of the history of science
in law is that the dichotomy between incrementalism and grand theorybuilding20 6 is a false one. Incrementalism-the gradual refinement of
legal theories guided by historical successes and failures-may result in

more enlightened grand theory-building. Critical legal studies, for example, adopted and distilled realist principles of indeterminacy.20 7 Similarly, a number of modem theories of scientific realism 208 are crafted
202. See, e.g., Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke (February 5, 1675), reprintedin 1 The Correspondence of Isaac Newton 416 (H. Turnbull ed. 1959) ("If I have
seen further it is by standing on... sho[u]lders of Giants."); see also Cohen, History and
the Philosopherof Science, in The Structure of Scientific Theories 308, 321 (F. Suppe ed.
1977) ("The development of an 'intertial' [sic] physics demonstrates how a scientist, in
'creating' a 'new theory' of 'his own', is apt to borrow or use or adapt a definition or a law
or an axiom or a principle, or even a whole theory, from one of his predecessors."). One
test of the viability of any novel scientific theory is convergence-how it fits with what we
already know. See P. Frank, Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy 350 (1957).
203. See Boyle, Legal Fiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 1013, 1018 (1987); see also Schlag,
CannibalMoves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction, 40 Stan. L.
Rev. 929, 931-34 (1988) (suggesting that legal distinctions have become less dichotomous
and less paradigmatic over time, but still operate in a schisming sort of way that is cannibalistic toward legal reasoning). Thomas Kuhn initiated the concept that thought
changes in paradigm shifts. See T. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 92-110
(2d ed. 1970).
204. See generally Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 Rutgers L.
Rev. 1 (1987) (describing how legal thought and argument is generally anti~omal).
205. The explanations provided by the history of science offer "a more and more unified perspective on a larger and larger body of detailed beliefs." D. Shapere, supra note
78, at 205.
206. See, e.g., Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331,
1376-77 (1988) (criticizing grand theory approach to constitutional law and suggesting a
pragmatic analysis).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 139-141.
208. See Fuller, supra note 7, at 552 (presenting a "particular brand of scientific realism that.., goes beyond simply postulating a distinction between the world and how we
think about it. It also recognizes a difference between our own social constructions and
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from components of realism and critical legal studies. One reason scienis the consensus
tific theories have successfully built on their predecessors
' 20 9
on "a standard of testability for evaluating theories."
It may be argued that reliance on the scientific method to analyze the
value of legal theories, or to guide decisions, heralds a return to formalism.21 0 This conclusion mistakes the nature and function of the principles of scientific inquiry. The criteria of confirmation offer no fixed
prescription for theory development; instead, they provide one method of
evaluating a theory. Moreover, the criteria themselves are not rigid, but
have historically been subject to modification and improvement.2 1
IV.

PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY AND DECISIONAL
METHODOLOGY

To what extent is the scientific method capable of shaping decisions?
The criteria of scientific inquiry cannot guide all judicial decisions; abstract concepts cannot prescribe tangible results in varied factual contexts.21 2 There can be no "scientific" program for decisionmaking;
indeed it would be most unscientific to suggest such a map. The principles of scientific inquiry, however, can lead to greater understanding of
how arguments and justifications are actually being used. They can reveal the use of legal fictions and hypostatizations and can promote
greater rationality in decisionmaking.
A.

How Unscientific Decisions Make Bad Law

In the tradition of critique coming more easily than a positive program, this section will offer examples of how "unscientific" decisionsdecisions that do not comport with the criteria of confirmation-lead to
unwise and unjust outcomes. These examples lead to some affirmative
suggestions on how judges can make better reasoned and more self-anahow we think about them."); Yablon, supra note 7, at 614 ("consider[ing] the relation
between law and philosophy, with particular emphasis on the realist period").
209. Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 Geo. L.J.
1341, 1342 (1987). On the unification of natural and social sciences and the restructuring
of explanatory propositions in the sciences into grander theories, see D. Fiske & R.
Shweder, Metatheory in Social Science (1986), and P. Snyder, Toward One Science
(1978).
210. Formalism is variously defined simply as deductive reasoning, see Posner, Legal
Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof Statutes and the Constitution, 37
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 179, 180-82 (1986), as false constraints on interpretive choices in
theory, see Tushnet, supra note 194, at 1505-07, and as "the way in which rules achieve
their 'ruleness' ... by... screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive
decisionmaker would otherwise take into account." Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J.

509, 510 (1988).
211. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
212. Indeed, the experimental and tentative nature of science seems to be at its core
antidecisional in the sense of requiring continued and particularized studies and amassment of data.
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lytical decisions. 21 3

Last term, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 2 14 the Supreme Court handed
down what may be the quintessential unscientific decision. While married to Gerald D., Carole D. conceived a child, Victoria, during an affair
with Michael H. Blood tests established a 98.07 percent probability of
Michael's paternity, and the parties stipulated that Michael was Victoria's natural father. During her first three years, Victoria was raised by
Carole, but they lived in varied family settings. At times, they lived with
Michael who developed a parental relationship with Victoria and held
her out as his daughter. Eventually, Carole reconciled with her husband,
Gerald, with whom she and Victoria now live. When Carole later refused Michael visitation, he filed a filiation action to establish paternity
and obtain visitation rights.
Michael and Victoria's guardian ad litem sought visitation rights for
Michael. On the recommendation of a court-appointed psychologist, the
Superior Court granted Michael visitation privileges. Gerald moved for
summary judgment, arguing that a California evidentiary statute conclusively presumed "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who
'
is not impotent or sterile . . . to be a child of the marriage." 215
The
Superior Court granted Gerald's motion, after finding that Carole and
Gerald cohabited at conception and birth. The principal issue before the
Supreme Court was whether application of the conclusive evidentiary
presumption violated Michael's substantive due process rights. 2 16 The
Supreme Court held that Michael lacked a protectible liberty interest,
because the due process guarantee applied only to "fundamental" interests "traditionally protected by our society."2' 17 The Court completed
the syllogism by finding the unitary family represented by Carole, Gerald
and Victoria deserving of protection,2 1 8 while the parental relationship
asserted by Michael H.-"the natural father of a child conceived within
and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace the
child" 2 9 -as undeserving of due process protection.
The Court's reasoning in Michael H. is incompatible with the criteria
of scientific inquiry. The critical problem with the decision is that the
Court, in determining the meaning of "fundamental" interests, favored a
hypothetical ideal-the unitary family-over the reality of the facts-a
213. Regarding the difficulties of diagramming procedures for critical thinking, see
Gutteridge, "'FirstSit Down and Play the PianoBeautifully. . . ". Reading Carefullyfor
CriticalThinking, 9 Informal Logic 81 (Spring & Fall 1987).
214. 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
215. Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a) (Supp. 1989).
216. See Michael H., 109 S. Ct. at 2341.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 2342.
219. Id. at 2344. The dissent notes, "no fewer than six times, the plurality refers to
Michael as the 'adulterous natural father.'" Id. at 2353 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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multiple family.22 ° This flaw is more serious than the Court's dismissal
of the empirical evidence: the 98.07 percent probability and the parties'
stipulation that Michael was Victoria's father; the evidence in the record
that Michael and Victoria had an established parent-child relationship;
and the psychologist's recommendation to preserve that relationship.2 2 '
More fundamentally, the deficiency is one of method. Imposing ideal
norms and values on situations that do not resemble the abstraction is
more than unscientific, it is unjust.
Michael H. fails to comport with the criteria of validation and also
fails as a matter of social vision. The decision bases rights in a changing
society on static historical tradition.2 22 Such inflexibility leads to a
closed system. Unyielding reliance on historical tradition and a lack of
inquiry into contextual changes is distinctly unscientific. Moreover, the
plurality engages in definitional gaming. According to the plurality, its
focus on whether an "adulterous natural father" has rights protected by
traditional notions of liberty interests is supportable because it "refer[s]
to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified., 223 The plurality's justification for its conclusion that adulterous natural fathers who
have an established parental relationship are undeserving of parental
rights is wholly dependent on its framing of the issue. Considering tradition with respect to the most specific possible application permits only
conservative changes in law. New applications and extensions of liberty
interests will not be adopted precisely because they have not previously
been encountered. The Court's definitional gambit is selective and persuasive rather than explanatory. It is circular and is clearly aimed at
reaching a certain result, rather than promoting inquiry. The criteria of
the scientific method, on the other hand, suggest that data be defined so
as to open the possibilities of new knowledge, rather than to constrain
exploration.2 2 4
Michael H. is an instructive example of how the principles of scientific
inquiry can be used to critique a decision. More generally, the principles
can help shape approaches to law, especially in cases where values clash
220. In the battle between theory and phenomena, the scientist must be willing to discard the former, not the latter. See supra note 132.
221. Any scientific decision must be in accord with and supported by the empirical
data. See J. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems 78 (1971). For another
example of the conceptual (pardon the expression) mishandling of empirical evidence, see
Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 473 (1981) (upholding a
statutory rape law directed only at males on the wholly unsupported assertion that "the
risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence [to intercourse] to young females" and the correlative, and equally unsupported, assumption that the presence of
statutory rape laws will deter male teenagers from having sex).
222. See Michael H., 109 S.Ct. at 2344 n.6 (discussing the lack of "historical traditions" conferring rights on "an adulterous natural father").
223. Id. at 2344 n.6.
224. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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and the consequences of a given value choice are unknown or disputed.
The debate over the regulation of pornography is one example.
Early decisions permitted the suppression of obscene books and films
based, in part, on the belief that viewing pornographic material caused

violent behavior.225 Subsequent research on the link between pornography and violence proved inconclusive. The 1970 Presidential Commission on Obscenity and Pornography reported that some researchers
determined that pornography has a cathartic effect that actually reduces
crime by affording an outlet for sexual urges.2 26 The 1986 Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography ("Meese Commission") reached the
22 7
opposite conclusion.
The Meese Commission has been ridiculed for its unobjective composition,2 2 its limited survey of the social science data2 29 and its selective use
of existing research. 230 Some cross-cultural research suggests that violent crime against women is attributable to many factors other than pornography. 231 Laboratory studies suggest that repeated exposure to
violent pornography induces not violence, but boredom.2 3 2 In short,
225. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973). But see A Book
Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S.
413, 431-32 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
226. See Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Report of the Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography 147 (1970).
227. See Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report 324 (1986)
[hereinafter Meese Comm'n Report]. The Commission concluded that "exposure to sexually violent materials," id. at 325, leads to "an increase in aggressive behavior directed
towards women." Id. at 325-26. However, two of the twelve Commission members dissented from the Commission's finding of a causal link between pornography and violence.
See id. at 203-07.
228. See, e.g., B. Lynn, Polluting the Censorship Debate: A Summary and Critique of
the Final Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography 14-16 (1986)
(ACLU Public Policy Report) (cataloguing prior public stands opposing pornography
taken by most Commission members).
229. See, e.g., Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornographyas
Act and Idea, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 1564, 1602 n.177 (1988) (comparing Meese Commission's
lack of a systematic study of the existing data with Canada's 1985 Fraser Commission's
wide canvass of the literature; the Fraser Commission reached conclusions opposite those
of the Meese Commission).
230. See Hunter & Law, BriefAmici Curiaeof Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et
al., in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 69, 72 (Fall
1987-Winter 1988). To establish the connection between pornography and violence, the
Meese Commission's most frequent reference was to the work of Dr. Edward Donnerstein. While Donnerstein's research shows that in a laboratory setting, repeated exposure
to violent pornography decreases males' sensitivity to violence toward women, Donnerstein himself has cautioned that his research is limited to the effect of pornography on
attitudes, not behavior. See Note, Violent Pornographyand the Obscenity Doctrine: The
Road Not Taken, 75 Geo. L.J. 1475, 1491 (1987).
231. See Abramson & Hayashi, Pornography in Japan: Cross-culturaland Theoretical
Considerations,in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 173, 180-83 (N. Malamuth & E.
Donnerstein eds. 1984).
232. See Roberts, The Obscenity Exception: Abusing the FirstAmendment, 10 Cardozo
L. Rev. 677, 697 n.100 (1989).
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there is a dearth of sound empirical evidence causally linking pornography and violent crimes against women.
In light of the absence of a conclusive empirical link between sexually
explicit material and violence, the arguments in favor of suppression
have changed. Some feminists, such as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine
MacKinnon, have joined the conservative call for regulation of pornography,23 3 contending that pornography disempowers women by reinforcing
sexist attitudes. 23 4 For purposes of this inquiry, the conflict focuses on
the clash of free speech values and the values of preventing female

subordination.
The application of the criteria of rationality would resolve the dispute
in favor of preserving first amendment values.2 35 First, the openness required by the scientific method supports the free flow of ideas, including-perhaps emphasizing-ideas that are not mainstream and thoughts
that are unpopular or even deviant.2 36
Second, the criterion of simplicity favors the absence of regulation.
Leaving sexually explicit materials unregulated offers the best chance for
a unified and integrated approach to first amendment law, especially considering the variety of modern obscenity237 and the immense difficulties
233. See, e.g., A. Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women xvii-xviii, xxviiixxxiv (1981); MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 321, 329-40 (1984).
234. See MacKinnon, Pornography,Civil Rights and Speech, 20 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 1, 16-20 (1985); see also Ordinance to Amend Minneapolis, Minn. Code of Ordinances, Title 7, chs. 139, 141 § 3 (1982) (passed Dec. 30, 1983; vetoed Jan. 5, 1984)
(defining pornography as "a form of discrimination based on sex").
235. In fact, a theorist applying scientific principles to the debate would not stop with
defeat of the MacKinnon-Dworkin position. For similar reasons, the criteria of inquiry
would find too restrictive even the current test for determining when sexually related
material is obscene:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest... ;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (citations omitted).
236. While science is cumulative, see supra note 202 and accompanying text, this does
not mean that conformity to majority ideas is a requisite of scientific theory. If Planck
and Einstein, for example, had tracked the path of classical physics, they would not have
founded quantum physics. See Kaufmann, supra note 40, at 469; see also Post, Cultural
Heterogeneityand Law. Pornography,Blasphemy, and the FirstAmendment, 76 Calif. L.
Rev. 297 (1988).
237. With technological advances and commercial innovations, a wide variety of communications in different media are argued to be pornographic. See, e.g., Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 855 (2d Cir. 1986) (considering standards for
analyzing federal dial-a-porn regulations); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281 (10th
Cir. 1983) (upholding district court dismissal of action for injunction against enforcement
of city ordinance banning promotion of sexually oriented material to minors); Community Television of Utah, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1108-09 (D. Utah 1985)
(holding the Utah Cable Television Programming Decency Act unconstitutionally overbroad and vague), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986),
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of distinguishing violence-inciting pornography (if it exists) from erotica. 238 Moreover, the criteria of rationality do not support the creation
of ad hoc rules regulating that which is only theoretically harmful.23 9
Third, a scientific theoretician should examine the unspoken assumption of the MacKinnon-Dworkin subordination theory: that women are
a class in need of protection from sexually explicit material. This chauvinism depends on unwarranted suppositions about class characteristics
of both men and women. 2 ' Furthermore, regulations premised on paternalism may perpetuate and reinforce those stereotypes. 24 1 The scientific method of contextualizing is inconsistent with a hypothetical
assumption that pornography is always subjugating.24 2
Fourth, the criterion of falsifiability requires an explicit, unambiguous
definition of pornography. One difficulty with the Indiana antipornography ordinance, for example, was the vague and self-protected
nature of its terms, such as "who enjoy.., humiliation;.., presented in
scenarios of degradation; ... shown.., as inferior; ...presented .. for

...conquest... through postures or positions of servility or submission

' ' 243
or display.

aff'd, 480 U.S. 926 (1987); see also Comment, RegulatingRock Lyrics: A New Wave of
Censorship?,23 Harv. J. Legis. 595, 598-602 (1986) (analyzing proposals for regulating,
rating and labeling rock lyrics that contain explicit sexual references); Note, Motor Vehicles: Ban Obscene Bumper Stickers, 5 Ga. St. U.L. Rev. 440, 44042 (1988) (discussing
Georgia legislation to prohibit the knowing attachment of "any obscene bumper sticker
to any motor vehicle").
238. See, e.g., Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinancesand the Attorney General'sCommission:
New Developments in PornographyRegulation, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 27, 85 (1986)
("The highly personal character of a viewer's response to pornography ...renders specious the claim that it is analytically and legislatively possible to draw 'objective' distinctions between pornography and erotica."). Even feminists who advocate suppression of
pornography confess the difficulties of distinguishing between pornography and erotica.
Andrea Dworkin contends that "'in the male sexual lexicon, which is the vocabulary of
power, erotica is simply high-class pornography: better produced, better conceived, better executed, better packaged, designed for a better class of consumer.'" Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism and Pornography, 2 Const. Commentary 147, 166
(1985). The solution these feminists advance, however, is the regulation of all material
that could be either pornographic or erotic and that subordinates women.
239. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussion of how ad hoc hypotheses
violate the precept of simplicity).
240. See, e.g., Hunter & Law, supra note 230, at 126 ("The [Indianapolis] ordinance
assumes that in sexuality, degradation is a condition that attaches to women .... [TJhe
ordinance assumes that women as a class are subordinated and hurt by depictions of sex,
and- men are not. The ordinance reinforces yet another sexist stereotype of men as aggressive beasts."). For a discussion of why chauvinism is unscientific, see supra text accompanying note 54.
241. See Hunter & Law, supra note 230, at 122-28.
242. The Meese Commission's conclusion that pornography is degrading and humiliating relies in large part on testimony from individual women. See Meese Comm'n Report,
supra note 227, at 773-835.
243. Indianapolis, Ind., Code of Indianapolis and Marion County, Indiana § 16-3(q)
(1984). See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1338-39
(S.D. Ind. 1984) (criticizing the vagueness of the elements defining "pornography" in the
Indiana ordinance), aff'd, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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Finally, assuming that first amendment law should seek to reduce sexual stereotyping and subjugation of women, the criteria of scientific inquiry would still favor free expression over censorship to attain that
objective. The MacKinnon-Dworkin argument is that a system purged
of pornography will become a clean canvas on which to create an empowered image of women. 2" This argument is flatly contradicted by histories of other types of forbidden fruit,24 5 depends on a unicausal vision
of female subordination, 24 6 and offers the least extensible or fertile solu-

tion to the problem of female degradation. Permitting pornography may
lead to presently unknown solutions to this problem 24 7 without the evils
of censorship. Indeed, the "marketplace of ideas" theory at the core of
the first amendment-that deleterious speech is best combatted with

more speech-is far more compatible with the criteria of scientific inquiry than is censorship.2 48
The pornography debate provides one example of the analytic utility of
scientific principles in legal decisionmaking. Some criteria of inquiry
have already been used to analyze issues such as the teaching of creationism in public school science classes2 49 and the availability of strict liability theory for a tort action against a manufacturer of defective goods.250

244. See, eg., Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship,Pornographyand Equality, 8 Harv. Women's L.J. 1, 23-24 (1985) (by challenging pornography women gain
equality).
245. See generally Bonnie & Whitebread, The ForbiddenFruitand the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the Legal History of American MarijuanaProhibition, 56 Va. L.
Rev. 971, 1174-80 (1970) (restrictive drug laws do not prevent marijuana use); Note,
ZoningAway the Evils ofAlcohol, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1373 (1988) (zoning laws inappropriate to combat alcohol abuse).
246. If subjugation of women has other antecedents-such as differential acculturation
within the family or a history of educational or employment disadvantages-eradication
of sexually explicit pictures and stories will not eliminate the subordination; censorship
will not create educational opportunities or cure wage differentials.
247. Historically, pornography has been linked with sexual and artistic liberation. See
Forkosch, Pornobscenity,Morals, and JudicialDiscrimination,7 Cap. U.L. Rev. 579, 579
(1978); Note, Regulation of Pornography: Is Erotica Self-Expression Deservingof Protection?, 33 Loyola L. Rev. 445, 457-60 (1987); see also Colker, Published ConsentlessSexual
Portrayals: A ProposedFrameworkfor Analysis, 35 Buffalo L. Rev. 39 (1986) (suggesting
that individuals should have a remedy for consentless sexual portrayals). See generally S.
Sontag, Styles of Radical Will 35-73 (1969) (discussing the literary genre of
pornography).
248. The values promoted by free expression are one with the criteria of inquiry: advancement of inquiry and knowledge and open exchange of thoughts and ideas. See
Emerson, Pornographyand the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon, 3
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 130, 133 (1984); see also State v. Han, 63 Haw. 418, 421 n.3, 629
P.2d 1130, 1133 n.3 (1981) ("Some commentators emphasize the value of sexually explicit material for sex education in general. Studies have found that in a practical sense,
commercial erotics is the only graphic information about sex that many adolescents ever
receive.").
249. See McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255, 1267-72 (E.D. Ark.

1982).

250. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 288 (Alaska 1976) (referring to simplicity and comprehensiveness as reasons offered in Clary v. Fifth Ave.
Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969), for preferring strict liability theory).
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The ultimate utility of the criteria of rationality in decision-making
awaits further application and testing.
B.

The Unscientific Use of EmpiricalEvidence

Use of scientific or social science evidence in a decision does not mean
that a court is employing the scientific method. While failure to conform
a decision to empirical data is generally unscientific, 2 51 the converse
proposition is not necessarily true: reliance on empirical evidence does
not make a decision scientifically sound.
Perhaps the best illustration of this point is Muller v. Oregon,2 52 the
first decision using social science evidence. In Muller, defendants
presented the Supreme Court with the original Brandeis Brief, a collection of social science data2 5 urging the Court to regulate working hours
for women, even though substantial precedent prohibited such regulation
for men.25 4 The Court complied, giving the following reasons for reducing working hours for women: "'(a) the physical organization of women, (b) her maternal functions, (c) the rearing and education of the
children, (d) the maintenance of the home .... "255
Thus, the first use of empirical evidence to shape a decision produced a
protectionist and chauvinist rule. 25 6 As this Article has explained, chauvinism is an unscientific value because it relies on a priori assumptions
about class characteristics. 25 7 The use of class-based data in Muller also
violated the principle of simplicity; if the argument was that long hours
endanger the health of workers, the simplest form of proof would link
health consequences to workers in general, not to women. While the contextual approach of Brandeis briefing is consistent with the requirement
that theories possess external validity, empirical evidence is often easy to
manipulate. Use of empirical evidence is not tantamount to use of the
principles of scientific inquiry; the entire argument must still be evalu251. See supra note 221.
252. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
253. The brief included government statistics, surveys and factory inspection reports.
See id. at 420 n.1.
254. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905).
255. Muller, 208 U.S. at 420 n.1 (citation omitted).
256. See Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 Duke L.J.
624, 633 n.54 ("the social science data in the famous Brandeis Brief were designed in part
to show that women were inferior to men and thus incapable of entering into their own
employment contracts without state regulation").
257. See supra text accompanying note 54. I feel obliged to point out the obvious
counterpart to the use of social science evidence in Muller: in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), plaintiffs introduced, and the Court gave limited recognition to
social science data that indicated the deleterious effects of segregation on school children.
See id. at 494 n.11. This use of empirical evidence-which was intended to question the
assumptions in and effect of a rule of law that was based on uninformed conclusions about
class characteristics-would promote the scientific goals of inquiry, openness and simplicity (a lack of autoexplanations regarding members of the same species).
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ated. Thus, one must examine the ends or objectives to which empirical
evidence is being put.
The contention that the criteria of validation can improve judicial
decisionmaking is a far cry from the suggestion that adjudication can be
reduced to laboratory acrobatics. The claim is more modest: that the
principles of scientific inquiry offer one means of assessing the rationality
of alternative decisional possibilities.
C. Implicationsfor Stare Decisis
It may be argued that use of a more scientific model would produce
dangerous upheavals in established bodies of legal doctrine. Indeed,
commentators have already catalogued the horrors of rapid judicial responses to "state of the art" empirical findings.25 8 Their criticism is
either partly misplaced or trivial.
The principles of scientific inquiry do not encourage a rapid reaction to
each new empirical study. Indeed, the requirement that theories be supported by a wealth of cumulative and converging evidence suggests a
cautious attitude toward novel ideas.2 59 While the requirement of falsifiability does not mandate the actual physical testing of theories, it does
call for their careful conceptual refinement.2 "' In practice, modern
courts have hesitated to accept novel social science theories in legal
proceedings.2 61
The possibility that a more scientific approach to law would disrupt
longstanding precedent may not be all bad. If precedent is considered a
suggestion that a decisionmaker examine prior cases for guidance on the
relevant legal rules and policy considerations, the principles of scientific
inquiry would call for the same course of action-the gathering of relevant data. On the other hand, the principles of scientific inquiry are inconsistent with the meaning given to stare decisis by Professor Frederick
Schauer. He defines stare decisis as a "naked argument from precedent"
that "urges that a decisionmaker give weight to a particular result regardless of whether that decisionmaker believes it to be correct and regardless of whether that decisionmaker believes it valuable in any way to
258. See, eg., Conley, "The FirstPrinciple of Real Reform" The Role of Science in
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,65 N.C.L. Rev. 935, 935-36 (1987) (linking Justice Holmes'
infamous capsulization that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough" in Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927), to the eugenics movement of the 1920s).
259. Philosopher of science Imre Lakatos has emphasized that "scientific theories are
rarely abandoned upon the first observation that purports to refute them." Wonnell,
Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 669, 712 (1986); see also D.
Hollinger, Morris R. Cohen and the Scientific Ideal 150 (1975) ("one does not 'throw out'
an old theory because of a few instances of disconfirmation").
260. See C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science 40 (1966) (discussing the quantum
of proof necessary to dislodge established theories).
261. For example, courts have been slow to accept, and in many instances have rejected the use of scientific evidence such as rape trauma syndrome, polygraph results and
rapist profiles, because those constructs lacked general acceptance or reliability. See
Handler, supra note 6, at 7.
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rely on that previous result. ' 262 The principles of critical inquiry would
encourage instead an evaluation of the reasons behind the rule. This is
not a radical proposal.2 63 The idea that the role of precedent be limited
by its ability to explain and persuade, as well as by the factual similarity
between the cases, is probably the prevailing view of stare decisis. 2 6
Finally, the values promoted by stare decisis--certainty and predictability, as well as rationality and self-awareness, can be achieved through
use of more scientific principles of inquiry. Reliance on precedent should
mean more than unthinking dependence on the rule enunciated in a prior
similar case; the factual applicability, context and breadth of the rule as
well as policy considerations should enter the decisional calculus. The
265
criteria of validation offer some guidance for evaluating policy choices
and provide tools intended to promote rational inquiry.
V.

THE MORAL OF THE STORY

The history of how theories of jurisprudence treat scientific inquiry
reveals significant gaps. In the tradition of babies and bathwater, when
science got a bad name during the realist era because techniques of empirical verification did not keep pace with theory development, jurisprudence silently dispensed with the scientific method. Although there has
been an increasing recognition (from realism to law and society to critical
legal studies) that law does not operate in a vacuum, the methods of
inquiry pursued by certain schools of jurisprudence are unscientific. The
jurisprudence of practical reason, for example, encourages decisionmaking that is not open, not verifiable and not meaningful. While certain
theories, such as legal realism or law and economics, claim to be more
"scientific" than others, they actually appear to be more interested in coopting the mystique of objectivity that surrounds things scientific than in
carefully analyzing theories according to the criteria of scientific inquiry.
This Article has delineated the criteria of inquiry that comprise the
modem scientific method. It suggests that these requirements of good
theory-crafting can be applied to analyze and critique the rationality and
fruitfulness ofjurisprudential theories. The criteria of validation can also
assist judges in deciding individual cases if applied to the objectives
sought by litigants. Finally, the Article posits that the criteria of scien262. Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 576 (1987).
263. See Douglas, StareDecisis, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 735, 737 (1949) ("stare decisis must
give way before the dynamic component of history"); Salmond, The Theory of Judicial
Precedents, 16 Law Q. Rev. 376, 381 (1900) (previous decisions that do not follow principles of sound reasoning should have no binding force); see also H.L.A. Hart, The Concept
of Law 127 (1961) (rigid adherence to precedent can lead judges to totally ignore social
goals in deciding cases); H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 148-49 (1946)
(because legislature cannot foresee all possible outcomes when it creates general legal
norms, judge is authorized to create new norms to fill in gaps when applying general
norms would lead to inequitable outcome).
264. See Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 367 (1988).
265. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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tific inquiry do not become impotent when value questions are posed. In
fact, the criteria themselves suggest certain values.
The intent of this Article is not to scientize jurisprudence. 266 It calls
instead for legal philosophy to become more self-analytical, more selfaware and more precise in its use of the concepts of science. Applying
scientific criteria to law requires that legal theorists more sensitively and
widely employ concepts and findings from economics, psychology, sociology and other areas of study. Application of these criteria to law
promises to lead to more rational theory-building and to greater inquiry
in decisionmaking. As the criteria of inquiry suggest, the ultimate value
of science to law depends on further testing of the scientific method in
jurisprudence and decision-making.
This attempt to integrate the worlds of law and science does not pretend to be a steady bridge between the two. 2 67 Instead, the journey has

been an effort to assimilate some of the ways of scientific inquiry into the
traditions of jurisprudence-to inform legal thinkers of another way of
viewing their world. I have suggested that some theories of jurisprudence have not been precedent-setting, at least in part because the theme
of science has been missing or mistold. As jurisprudential thinkers "continue to create narratives... to instruct and amuse their audiences, "268
perhaps they will weave in the story of science to craft more powerful
legends-legends without myths, legends with renewed vision, legends
with enduring power.
266. Law itself is fundamentally a technology, not a science. Its aims-order, retribution, equality, fairness and so on-are something other than the advancement of knowledge. But then why do we want to make law, the technology, more "scientific"? The
argument has been that the criteria of the scientific method provide a means of increasing
not the experimental sophistication of law, but its rationality.
267. See J. Mathews, The Osages: Children of the Middle Waters 15-16 (1961).
268. Ruoff, The Survival of Tradition: American Indian Oral and Written Narratives,

27 Mass. Rev. 274, 287 (1986).

